

# **NGO Meeting on the Responsibility to Protect**

**FINAL REPORT**

**November 26, 2002  
New York, USA**

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## II. MEETING PARTICIPANTS

**Organizers:** Kathleen Hunt, CARE International; Rory Mungoven, Human Rights Watch; William Pace, World Federalist Movement-Institute for Global Policy

**NGO Representatives:** Yvonne Terlingen, Amnesty International; David Bryer, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue; Jeanne Sulzer, Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l'Homme; Pauline Baker, Fund for Peace; Simon Chesterman, International Peace Academy; Nicola Reindorp, Oxfam International Advocacy; Professor Thomas Weiss, Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies, The CUNY Graduate Center; Peter Walker, Tufts University; Lenore Hickey and Jayne Stoyles, World Federalist Movement-Institute for Global Policy.

**Government Representatives:** Don Hubert and Patrick Wittman, Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs

## III. BACKGROUND

“...Hardly a day goes by where we are not presented with evidence of the intimidation, brutalization, torture and killing of helpless civilians in situations of armed conflict. Whether it is mutilations in Sierra Leone, genocide in Rwanda, ethnic cleansing in the Balkans or disappearances in Latin America...[r]ebel factions, opposition fighters and Government forces continue to target innocent civilians with alarming frequency.”

Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, S/199/957, 8 September 1999

Much was written towards the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century regarding the changing nature of conflict, with widespread recognition of its increasing toll on innocent people: children, women and men not involved in the conflict. Mass murder, widespread rape and forced sexual slavery, the recruitment of child soldiers, the use of civilian populations as human shields, torture, disappearances, forced displacement and the use of chemical weapons are only a few of the unspeakable atrocities committed by governments, rebel groups and others in the past decades.

Awareness of these issues has led to some important developments. These include, among others, the adoption of Security Council resolutions on the protection of civilians in armed conflict and on women and peacekeeping; the strengthening of international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law; the creation of enforcement mechanisms such as the ad hoc tribunals for Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia and the historic International Criminal Court; the adoption of a treaty banning the use of anti-personnel landmines and a protocol protecting the rights of children in armed conflict; and a greater emphasis on the prevention of conflict.

The willingness on the part of sovereign nations to create and abide by new international norms, laws and standards is having an important effect on the ability of the international community to respond in meaningful ways to humanitarian crises. Nevertheless, these norms are still emerging and some remain controversial. In particular, questions surrounding the right of one nation to intervene militarily in response to a humanitarian crisis in another nation are still widely debated. At the same time, the failure of the international community to respond to mass atrocities has also been deeply criticized.

“Humanitarian intervention’ has been controversial both when it happens, and when it has failed to happen. Rwanda in 1994 laid bare the full horror of inaction. The United Nations (UN) Secretariat and some permanent members of the Security Council knew that officials...were planning genocide; UN forces were present...and credible strategies were available to prevent, or at least greatly mitigate, the slaughter which followed. But the Security Council refused to take the necessary action.... Kosovo-where intervention *did* take place in 1999-...raised major questions about the legitimacy of military intervention in a sovereign state.”

*The Responsibility to Protect*, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, December 2001, p.1

A predominant challenge to non-consensual military intervention is that some such interventions have in fact been undertaken to allow the intervening nation to pursue self-interested foreign policy objectives; other concerns include the failure to first exhaust non-military options, unequal attention to countries and regions on the basis of their strategic importance to the strongest military powers, a disproportionate use of force and the commission of other serious crimes during the operations.

Some of the most difficult questions surrounding this issue arise from the need to balance respect for the sovereignty of individual states with the perceived responsibility of the international community to intervene when the rights of individuals, in particular the right to life, are being threatened on a massive scale. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan highlighted this debate in his Millennium Report to the General Assembly, yet noted that “no legal principle - not even sovereignty - can ever shield crimes against humanity.”

In presenting the Millennium Report to the General Assembly in September 2000, the Secretary General repeated a call he had made during the 54<sup>th</sup> General Assembly in 1999, for UN Member States to take on the task of finding this balance and developing guidelines for the response of the international community to threats of large scale loss of life.

### ***The Responsibility to Protect***

In response, the Canadian government established the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), with the support of several major foundations. A series of roundtable discussions in different regions with representatives from governments, inter-governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations,

universities, research institutes and think tanks led to a report which attempts to reframe the debate. The report is based on the notion that it is the responsibility of a sovereign nation to protect the dignity and basic rights of its own citizens, and that it is the responsibility of the international community to react “where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it.” Thus the Commission proposes a change in terminology from the right of ‘humanitarian intervention’ to the ‘responsibility to protect’.

One of the central aspects of the ICISS Report is its conclusion that the responsibility to protect comprises more than the responsibility to react under the circumstances mentioned above; equally important is the ‘responsibility to prevent’, addressing both root causes and direct causes of internal crises, and the ‘responsibility to rebuild’. An emphasis is placed on prevention as the most important aspect of the responsibility to protect, while the Report stresses that military intervention should always be a last resort, with the least intrusive and coercive means used as possible.

While a chapter is devoted to the types of measures that constitute prevention, reaction and rebuilding, the Report is primarily focused on questions of intervention. Principles for military intervention are proposed, including the ‘just cause threshold’, precautionary principles (right intention, last resort, proportional means and reasonable prospects), right authority (with an emphasis on the UN Security Council), and operational principles. Questions about the role of the Security Council and what happens when the Security Council fails to act are examined, with another chapter devoted to the operational dimensions of military intervention.

### ***Next Steps and the Role of Non-Governmental Organizations***

The Government of Canada and other interested governments have now embarked on an effort to gain support for the general principles set out in the ICISS Report and the development of mechanisms for their implementation. In particular, it appears that emphasis will be placed, *inter alia*, on: the development of new norms to reframe the debate from a right of humanitarian intervention to a responsibility to protect; and questions of how to operationalize the Responsibility to Protect through the Security Council.

Canadian Government officials have indicated their intention to host a series of roundtable discussions with other governments, to advance the concept within regional governmental bodies and bilaterally, and amongst parliamentarians, NGOs and the media. A group of countries supporting the concept of the Responsibility to Protect has begun to form. In addition, the Report has been circulated as a UN document and negotiation of a technical resolution, with a view to a substantive resolution in the future, has begun. The Canadian Government has indicated that the UN General Assembly will be a primary focus of action for the development of new norms, while the Security Council will be the principal focus for operationalizing the Responsibility to Protect in

specific country situations. As part of the effort to involve non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the process of promoting these important concepts and developing effective mechanisms to ensure their implementation, the Canadian Government has approached the World Federalist Movement-Institute for Global Policy (WFM-IGP) to solicit its support. A request has been made that WFM-IGP play an active role in involving NGOs and other civil society actors in these next phases.

While NGOs were included among the groups consulted during the development of the ICISS Report, this was only a very small fraction of the organizations worldwide that are working on relevant issues. Obtaining their support for this initiative will be vital to its success; there is in fact a real danger that if the NGO community feels alienated from this process, it could become a negative force rather than a positive contributor. As a result, one of the main challenges that WFM-IGP will take on is to broaden the NGO consultations such that a variety of constituencies will begin to feel more integral to this process. These will include, among others, human rights organizations, humanitarian groups, women's rights advocates, the peace and disarmament movement, organizations focused on peace and security, groups working on transitional justice, etc.

In addition, the substantive input of non-governmental organizations based on their legal and political expertise and their field experience will be very valuable as governments work to develop support for and operationalize the concepts contained in the ICISS Report on the Responsibility to Protect. NGOs and other civil society groups are already very active in the prevention of mass atrocities, in particular in addressing root causes of conflict through development programs, the promotion of good governance, ensuring respect for human rights, humanitarian and refugee law, mediation efforts, and many other types of initiatives. There are organizations and networks worldwide with the mandate and capacity to assist in early warning of conflicts requiring attention by the international community, and others devoted to monitoring and providing input into the appropriate response of the United Nations and individual governments. Such organizations also play an important role in rebuilding. Their roles include providing humanitarian assistance, addressing issues of transitional justice (through mechanisms such as truth commissions and national and international trials), ensuring sustainable reconstruction of infrastructure, peace education, promoting the rights and addressing the needs of nationally displaced persons and refugees, promoting disarmament, and many others.

The ICISS Report highlights some of the challenges to ensuring effective responses to serious humanitarian crises that may result in large scale loss of life. Lack of coordination is highlighted, as is the absence of effective information-sharing and reporting mechanisms and an absence of mechanisms within the United Nations system for effective response. In addition, lack of resources, lack of political will, and politicized processes that lead to inaction are mentioned. The Report also makes many recommendations as to how such challenges could be met.

As governments begin to look at these recommendations, NGOs have an important role to play in helping to determine whether and how to carry specific ideas forward, and in

supporting their effective implementation. Their input will also help to ensure that other existing frameworks are considered, and ideas not included in the Report are also put on the table. NGO involvement in the evolution of norms that will move the international community beyond their reservations about the right to 'humanitarian intervention' will also be critical in reframing the debate.

The meeting in New York on November 26, co-hosted by CARE International, Human Rights Watch and the World Federalist Movement-Institute for Global Policy, was the first in a series of meetings that will be held over the coming months with the participation of key human rights and humanitarian organizations, policy experts and Canadian government officials.

#### **IV. PURPOSE OF THE MEETING**

The meeting had three central goals:

- to clarify and deepen the reaction of the human rights and humanitarian communities to the contents of the ICISS Report and assess the degree of policy cohesion within those communities with respect to the core principles of the Responsibility to Protect and to the proposed Principles for Military Intervention in response to mass atrocities
- to consider the prospects for consolidated NGO advocacy in relation to the Security Council and key member states on making good on the commitments and recommendations that have emerged during the last three years on the 'protection of civilians in armed conflict' agenda, including the Responsibility to Protect, the possibility of a network of NGOs on human security, and the establishment or elaboration of mechanisms to monitor Security Council actions on the protection of civilians
- to explore the possibility of consulting civil society organizations in other regions and sectors more directly regarding the Responsibility to Protect

#### **V. SUMMARY OF KEY POINTS**

##### ***Status of Inter-governmental Plans***

In this introductory part of the meeting, Canadian government officials and policy experts involved in the promoting the Responsibility to Protect among governments provided an overview of their current plans.

Canadian government officials expressed their view that the ICISS Report is a significant step in advancing the debate on the use of force and the protection of civilians. In particular, it is hoped that the concept of the Responsibility to Protect, embodied in the Report, will lead to new practices and the development of new international norms such that the culture of protection is strengthened. At the same time, it is Canada's view that

several of the underlying concepts in the Report are not fundamentally new. The Security Council has in isolated cases taken action to protect civilians, and has also agreed to some of the more general principles in its resolutions on the protection of civilians. What is important is to find mechanisms to ensure that the international community lives up to its promises in terms of the protection of civilians and the prevention of armed conflict, and develops principles for the consistent application of agreed principles of military intervention in the most extreme situations.

In terms of putting the concepts in the ICISS Report into action, Canada has taken a lead in developing a group of 'friendly countries' amongst UN members that are interested in being involved as this discussion moves forward. The ICISS Report has been circulated as a UN document and has been included in the agenda of the General Assembly under Item 44. Canada is also working to negotiate a technical resolution that will confirm formal recognition of the Report and ensure that it will be discussed in the General Assembly.

In addition, the Canadian government is undertaking a number of other 'tracks', including operational implementation of the ICISS Report in the Security Council; getting UN agencies such as the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to take on a bolder vision of the protection of civilians; media work, beginning in North America; outreach to the academic community by encouraging panel discussions, academic conferences and the development of teaching materials; promoting the concept among think tanks; holding national meetings in capitals for government representatives; and reaching out to parliamentarians and NGOs.

The Canadian government officials in attendance at the meeting expressed the view that while there are some opponents of the concept of the Responsibility to Protect, governments are in general far more receptive to the concepts in the ICISS Report than expected, and perhaps more than they are generally being portrayed to be.

The Canadian officials made clear that they are not advocating the ICISS Report *per se* in moving forward in the debate on the Responsibility to Protect. Rather, they see this in terms of a broader agenda on the protection of civilians, with the ICISS Report being one important tool. The Report is seen as being particularly useful in more clearly defining newly emerging norms and in advancing the debate on intervention (specifically the use of force). It is viewed as creating more, not fewer, rules for intervention; it could limit interventions while addressing many of the concerns that have arisen in situations like Rwanda, Kosovo and others.

### ***Responses of NGOs to Concepts in the ICISS Report***

None of the organizations in attendance expressed any significant reservations about the central concepts put forward in the ICISS Report, including understanding sovereignty as 'responsibility' rather than 'control', reframing the debate from a 'right of intervention' to a 'responsibility to protect', understanding this responsibility as including a

responsibility not only to react but also to prevent and to rebuild, and placing a strong emphasis on the responsibility to prevent.

The organizations in attendance had a variety of responses to the question of whether their organizations would be willing to take a position on military intervention, in particular the use of military force. It was explained that most *human rights* organizations generally maintain a position of impartiality and neutrality, refraining from commenting on the legality of a conflict but taking strong positions on the conduct within conflicts. This is a central focus of both Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. At the same time, Human Rights Watch has adopted a policy to call for military intervention under very specific circumstances. Amnesty International is unlikely to have such a policy, as the organization holds the view that every humanitarian crisis can be prevented, and it mistrusts that there are ever true humanitarian reasons when the international community decides to mount a military intervention. Other human rights organizations in attendance have not determined whether they would be willing to adopt such a policy, but in internal debates one of the central concerns raised regarding so-called humanitarian interventions has been the lack of consistency, suggesting that some lives are valued more than others.

It was further explained that the policy of neutrality within *humanitarian* organizations means that they tend not to take a position on the legality of the conflict or of the conduct within the conflict but focus instead on ensuring that the humanitarian needs of those on all sides are met. There would have to be a great deal of debate within some humanitarian organizations about the prospect of calling for military intervention before a position could be taken. At the same time, humanitarian organizations would bring considerable humanitarian expertise to assist in operationalizing the concepts in the ICISS Report. For example, they could assist in testing how the various recommendations in the Report would be put into practice. One participant emphasized that it will be very important to get humanitarian organizations looking not only at what to recommend to governments in terms of operationalizing the Report, but also to consider what this means for their own work from an operational perspective.

Several participants expressed the view that they did not agree with everything in the ICISS Report (as did the Canadian government officials), and think that there may be better frameworks to take this debate forward, such as the Protection of Civilians framework set out in the Aide Mémoire adopted by the Security Council in March 2002. Several expressed the view that it would be difficult to ask organizations to accept any large framework for looking at these issues; rather, the suggested approach is to look at smaller pieces and focus on how to put specific ideas into practice on a case-by-case basis. At the same time, there is a desire to ensure that organizations do not focus on the less controversial questions, and that they do consider the proposals in the ICISS Report in terms of intervention.

### ***Challenges and Opportunities in Taking Forward the Responsibility to Protect***

The following points were raised by participants:

- NGOs are likely to be quite supportive of the conceptual framework put forward in the ICISS Report – the notion that sovereignty includes a responsibility to protect, and that this includes a responsibility to prevent, to react and to rebuild, with prevention being the key priority
- what will be more difficult is to get agreement on whether there is a right to intervene militarily and if so, what principles should guide such actions
- the ICISS Report says little about what should happen when the Security Council fails to act, and this will be one of the most controversial questions
- the situation of the potential war in Iraq can be viewed as both a challenge and an opportunity in terms of promoting debate on these issues: some feel that a war in Iraq is focusing/will focus international attention on military intervention and create a climate conducive to developing principles for such interventions; others feel that it creates a bigger challenge because the Responsibility to Protect will only be seen in the context of whether it will constrain the US in acting unilaterally or not
- the environment was probably more conducive to this debate 10 years ago, when criteria for intervention and consistency in their application were clearly needed and the debate was not muddied by situations like the potential war in Iraq
- since the Responsibility to Protect framework embodies a range of elements from prevention to reaction to rebuilding, it will be easiest for organizations to focus on the uncontroversial question of prevention and not deal with the much more difficult issues surrounding a potential endorsement of intervention; at the same time, it is very important to include the prevention element as there will be no buy-in from organizations at all in the absence of this concept
- there will be particular challenges for humanitarian organizations in discussing the principles in the ICISS Report that relate to military intervention; one participant made a strong case for the need for humanitarian organizations to consider what true protection means rather than continuing to focus their debate on what neutrality means
- there will be some challenges in trying to ensure that those working on the protection of civilians, conflict prevention, improving peacekeeping etc. do not see the work on developing principles for military intervention as undermining their work in these other areas
- US dominance in the world and the emphasis of many governments on this relationship means that many will look at the proposals in the ICISS Report through the lens of whether they give the US more or less power
- there will be a challenge in engaging governments and NGOs in countries and regions where some form of response from the international community was needed to avert or lessen the impact of a serious humanitarian crisis and no response was forthcoming
- there is no political debate among governments and no attention from major media outlets at the moment to the question of so-called ‘humanitarian intervention’; generating attention to these issues will be particularly important and challenging
- at the same time, some NGOs are not only engaged in the discussion but have active programs on these issues

- unlike some of the other campaigns (eg. the ICC campaign), it will not be possible to go around the major powers because it will be necessary to have ‘buy-in’ from the five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council (“P5”) in order to put the concepts in the ICISS Report into action; at the same time, it was argued that the P5 are not the enemies of this agenda and that if one government tried to prevent a response from the international community to a serious crisis, a response would still be seen as legitimate
- it will be extremely difficult to get the UN Security Council to agree to anything that mandates when they will and will not act
- it may be necessary to consider a low profile approach on certain aspects (note that the ICC treaty would not have entered into force if the US opposition had come one year earlier)

### ***Membership, Role, Mandate of a Potential NGO Network***

There was some debate about whether the ‘price’ of membership in a potential NGO network around these issues would be to take a position on military intervention. The consensus that appeared to emerge was to allow membership to be more broad. This would be achieved by a network that had very broad principles, and used a modular approach (for example using caucuses and working groups), so that some groups could be involved in the establishment of international principles on military intervention and potentially call for intervention in specific cases, while others would participate in the network without having a position on this issue.

The debate seemed to coalesce around the idea of having an NGO network focus on several types of action. First, the dissemination of information about the Responsibility to Protect would be one role of a network. This was not fleshed out further, for example to discuss whether this would include information about the various reports on the prevention of conflict, protection of civilians, the Aide-Mémoire, the ICISS Report etc.

Second, the need for an advocacy role was discussed. One track would likely be to focus on holding the Security Council accountable for implementing the relevant recommendations on the Responsibility to Protect, such as those contained in the Secretary General’s reports on the Prevention of Conflict, the Protection of Civilians, the ICISS Report etc. Advocacy would also be focused on ensuring that the UN and the Security Council put the concept of the Responsibility to Protect into practice as specific situations arise. While some organizations would focus on the protection of civilians framework and undertaking more effective prevention efforts, others would be willing to advocate for military intervention should the prevention efforts fail. Another advocacy track might be focused on helping NGOs, in particular humanitarian organizations, to ‘operationalize’ the protection agenda within their own organizations.

A further set of activities could fall under a research and policy role. This would include providing input into the development of principles for military intervention such as those

proposed in the ICISS Report and might also involve assisting NGOs in determining how to put the concept of the Responsibility to Protect into practice in their own work.

The following additional points were raised:

- there is a need to ensure that any network that is developed is truly international and as diverse as possible
- advocacy work should emphasize regional organizations (examples given included the EU, AU, African Commission on Human Rights)
- a potential network should not try to provide an umbrella for all of the work being undertaken in terms of prevention (in particular root cause prevention), but rather should focus on the roles set out above, with an emphasis on advocacy before regional organizations, the United Nations as a whole, the Security Council and individual governments
- the network should rarely take action in the name of all the organizations involved but should facilitate the work of its members to allow them to take their own positions and work together as effectively as possible
- a guiding principle is likely to be ensuring that the principle of protecting civilians is uppermost in any operational response of the international community to a humanitarian crisis involving the potential for large scale loss of life
- a critical function of a network secretariat would be the collection and dissemination of information, and providing opportunities for information-sharing amongst its members
- many organizations have not read the ICISS Report so it will be important not to allow it to be framed solely as a document on military intervention or it will be resisted before it is clearly understood; should focus instead on a smaller piece to begin with, such as ensuring that the UN and Security Council implement the obligations they have accepted; some members of the network could then get involved in the development of military intervention guidelines if they chose to do so
- it would unlikely be a useful approach to try to involve a high level personality, particularly at this stage
- approaching the implementation of the concepts through issue-specific and country-specific approaches would be one useful way that a network could begin its work

#### ***Other Relevant Initiatives, Networks etc.***

Participants mentioned the following additional networks, organizations etc. relevant to this work that should be consulted/included:

- the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has been mandated by ECOSOC to take the protection of civilians mandate forward, and a series of regional workshops, focusing in particular on the Aide-Mémoire, is underway
- the Watch List on Children and Armed Conflict
- the network on the implementation of Resolution 1325

- the Security Council Working Group
- the Steering Committee on Humanitarian Response
- VOICE - Brussels
- International Council for Voluntary Agencies (ICVA)
- Interaction
- DPI conference
- child soldiers, small arms and other groups focusing on the human security agenda
- peace and disarmament communities

### *Next Steps*

There was a clear indication of commitment by the organizations in attendance to go forward in exploring a possible NGO role in promoting the concept of the Responsibility to Protect and supporting its operationalization. A recommendation was made that this be carried forward through a country-specific approach to test how the central concept would be put into practice. This could mean, for example, identifying countries where the three proposed elements of the Responsibility to Protect (namely prevention, reaction and rebuilding) could be put into effect. The suggested countries were Burundi for prevention, Liberia for reaction, and Afghanistan for rebuilding. It was also proposed that in addition to a country-specific approach, we could also look at an issue-specific approach, such as the development of Rules of Engagement.

The following considerations and proposals for next steps were also raised:

- it is important that we continue to hold consultations with some key organizations, in particular from the human rights and humanitarian communities; we cannot go to them with an agenda that is already defined because if they are not truly consulted early on, they will not support this initiative
- WFM plans to continue to hold such consultations, some of which will be repetitive and some of which will build on the ideas generated at this meeting (initially these are likely to be in Washington, DC; Geneva, Switzerland; London, UK; Porto Alegre, Brazil; Ottawa, Canada, and possibly elsewhere); we will also find meetings to which southern NGOs will be invited and then hold a ‘side event’, or organize meetings in southern countries
- NGO consultations will likely need to be relatively low profile
- we may need to come back to this group and others to take this to the next step, which is to determine exactly what we are going to be doing, what the priorities are and what the tactics will be
- it is important to get feedback from everyone on possible participants in the upcoming meetings, in particular to pinpoint southern NGOs that should be included
- there is a need to begin to deepen the discussion with organizations and networks that are already monitoring the Security Council on the protection of civilians and related issues
- a request was made that WFM ‘house’ the information collection piece and continue to coordinate NGO outreach
- we need to find the advocates of this agenda in the various UN agencies

- need a list of key government representatives that focus on the UN (in capitals)
- also need lists of key parliamentarians that should be engaged in this discussion
- will need some supplementary materials such as a summary of the ICISS Report and the highlights of other relevant reports
- it would be useful to have an informal background paper on where the process is in terms of government support
- if possible, we should try to come up with some kind of an awareness-raising event for December 10

## ANNEX A: DOCUMENTS DISTRIBUTED

### UN Documents and Reports

S/2001/331 Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the protection of civilians in armed conflict (30 March 2001)  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/Rwb.nsf/s/873B87DFA5E78ABB85256A2B005DD129>

S/1999/957 Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the protection of civilians in armed conflict (8 September 1999)  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/civilian.html>

S/RES/1379 – Security Council Resolution (30 August 2001)  
On Children and Armed Conflict  
<http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/651/10/PDF/N0165110.pdf?OpenElement>

S/RES/1366 - Security Council Resolution (20 November 2001)  
On the Role of the Security Council in the Prevention of Armed Conflict  
<http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/524/48/PDF/N0152448.pdf?OpenElement>

S/RES/1325 - Security Council Resolution (31 October 2000)  
On Women, Peace, and Security  
<http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/720/18/PDF/N0072018.pdf?OpenElement>

S/RES/1296 - Security Council Resolution (19 April 2000)  
On the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict  
<http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/399/03/PDF/N0039903.pdf?OpenElement>

S/RES/1265 - Security Council Resolution (17 September 1999)  
On the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict  
<http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/267/94/PDF/N9926794.pdf?OpenElement>

S/ PRST/2002/6 UN Security Council Presidential Statement Aide Memoire  
On Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Issues and Options  
Includes: Primary Objectives, Issues for Consideration, and Precedents  
<http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/288/93/IMG/N0228893.pdf?OpenElement>

A/55/305-S/2000/809

Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, Comprehensive Review of the whole question of Peacekeeping Operations in all its aspects (21 August 2000)

[http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace\\_operations/](http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/)

A/56/732 Implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Report of the Secretary-General – Comprehensive review of peacekeeping and all its aspects (21 December 2001)

[http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace\\_operations/](http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/)

### **Other Articles, Reports, Speeches**

“Debating Humanitarian Intervention,” by Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2002

“Humanitarianism in Crisis,” by David Rieff, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2002

“The Preventable Genocide” Executive Summary of the Report of the International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda  
full report available at: [www.oau-oau.org](http://www.oau-oau.org)

Prevention of Armed Conflict SG Report Summary (Lenore Hickey, WFM, July 2001)

Statement by Ambassador Paul Heinbecker Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations to the 57<sup>th</sup> Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Item 44: Follow-up to the Outcome of the Millennium Summit and Item 10: Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the organization, New York, October 2002  
[www.un.int/canada/s-15Oct2002Heinbecker.htm](http://www.un.int/canada/s-15Oct2002Heinbecker.htm)

Secretary-General Address to the “The Responsibility to Protect” report launch (NY) 15 February 2002 <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/sgsm8125.doc.htm>

Human Security Network - Background information: Members, Ministerial Meeting Updates & Notes [www.humansecuritynetwork.org](http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org)

## ANNEX B: ICISS REPORT SUMMARY

*The following summary has been reproduced from a report of a seminar on the Operational Dimensions of Intervention, Project Ploughshares, September 5 and 6, Waterloo, Canada.*

The ICISS Report was released at the end of 2001, and focused on the issue of international intervention. The ICISS Commission responded to a call from the UN Secretary-General to “forge unity” around the questions plaguing the issue of intervention. The resulting Report reframes the debate around intervention in terms of an obligation to protect populations at risk, and away from the “right of states to intervene.” In doing so, the Report offers a new language with which to talk about some of the toughest issues facing us in today’s world.

The Report argues that state sovereignty entails certain responsibilities toward a state’s own population, and in particular, providing for the basic safety of its citizens. When a state fails in its duty and is not protecting (or indeed, is targeting) its citizens, the international community has a duty to come to their aid. The Report thus emphasizes a holistic view of intervention that includes prevention, reaction and rebuilding. More specifically, protecting civilians involves first implementing a range of actions to *prevent* atrocities and address the root causes of conflict.

When these actions fail, the Report obliges the international community to *react*, intervening militarily if necessary and only in extraordinary circumstances. In making this decision to react with military force, the Report emphasizes a series of precautionary principles, including the criteria of just cause (the threshold conditions), right intention, last resort, proportional means, reasonable prospects, and right authority. Its goal is to prevent “another Rwanda.”

Last, the Report calls upon the international community to help *rebuild* a country after an intervention. This phase involves assistance with the recovery, reconstruction, and reconciliation components of the transition to a more peaceful society. This holistic view of intervention in general suggests that protecting civilians and vulnerable populations is a fundamentally different question and operation than fighting a war.

The ICISS Report can be found on-line at: <http://www.ciise-iciss.gc.ca/report-e.asp>