The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom

Security in an interdependent world

Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister, by command of Her Majesty

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Chapter One: Introduction

1.1 Providing security for the nation and for its citizens remains the most important responsibility of government.

1.2 Since the end of the Cold War, the international landscape has been transformed. The opposition between two power blocs has been replaced by a more complex and unpredictable set of relationships. Economic trends, including more open global markets, and technological trends, particularly in communications, have strengthened the connections between individuals, businesses, societies and economies. Travel is faster and cheaper than ever, the flow of ideas and capital around the world can be almost instantaneous, and distances between people and events are becoming less relevant. All those are positive changes, empowering individuals and creating new opportunities for businesses, organisations and whole nations. But they also create new challenges.

1.3 If the international landscape as a whole is increasingly complex and unpredictable, so too is the security landscape. No state threatens the United Kingdom directly. The Cold War threat has been replaced by a diverse but interconnected set of threats and risks, which affect the United Kingdom directly and also have the potential to undermine wider international stability. They include international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, conflicts and failed states, pandemics, and trans-national crime. These and other threats and risks are driven by a diverse and interconnected set of underlying factors, including climate change, competition for energy, poverty and poor governance, demographic changes and globalisation.

1.4 The aim of this first National Security Strategy is to set out how we will address and manage this diverse though interconnected set of security challenges and underlying drivers, both immediately and in the longer term, to safeguard the nation, its citizens, our prosperity and our way of life.

1.5 The scope and approach of this strategy reflects the way our understanding of national security has changed. In the past, the state was the traditional focus of foreign, defence and security policies, and national security was understood as dealing with the protection of the state and its vital interests from attacks by other states. Over recent decades, our view of national security has broadened to include threats to individual citizens and to our way of life, as well as
to the integrity and interests of the state. That is why this strategy deals with transnational crime, pandemics and flooding – not part of the traditional idea of national security, but clearly challenges that can affect large numbers of our citizens, and which demand some of the same responses as more traditional security threats, including terrorism. The broad scope of this strategy also reflects our commitment to focus on the underlying drivers of security and insecurity, rather than just immediate threats and risks.

1.6 We need to maintain a set of capabilities, at home and overseas, to deal with those threats and risks and the underlying drivers – to understand them better, act early to prevent them where we can, and ensure that we minimise and manage any harm they might cause.

1.7 This is the first time the Government has published a single, overarching strategy bringing together the objectives and plans of all departments, agencies and forces involved in protecting our national security. It is a significant step, and the latest in a series of reforms bringing greater focus and integration to our approach.

National security reform since 2001

Strategy

- **2002**: ‘New Chapter’ added to the Strategic Defence Review, setting out the contribution of the Armed Forces to counter-terrorism
- **2006**: First cross-government counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST, and cross-government counter-proliferation framework
- **2008**: New strategic framework for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), underlining how national security depends on our work with other nations.

Structures

- **2001**: Conflict Prevention Pools to improve joint working between the FCO, Ministry of Defence, and Department for International Development; and new Cabinet Office structures dealing with emergencies
- **2003**: Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre bringing together expertise from the police, intelligence agencies and 16 departments
- **2006**: Serious and Organised Crime Agency

(continued)
Chapter One: Introduction

1.8 This strategy is the next step in building on those reforms. It sets out the guiding principles of our approach (Chapter Two); our assessment of the major security challenges and drivers of insecurity (Chapter Three); our responses to them (Chapter Four); and how we will work together in taking the strategy forward (Chapter Five).

1.9 Throughout, it draws on the wide range of knowledge and activity across departments, agencies and forces which contributes to our single overarching national security objective of protecting the United Kingdom and its interests, enabling its people to go about their daily lives freely and with confidence, in a more secure, stable, just and prosperous world.

- **2007**: Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism, to manage the cross-government counter-terrorism effort; new UK Border Agency announced; and new Cabinet Committee on National Security, International Relations and Development, bringing together ministers from across Government.

**Resources**

- Funding on counter-terrorism and intelligence increased from £1 billion in 2001 to £2.5 billion this year, rising to £3.5 billion by 2010/11
- A new Single Security and Intelligence Budget across different departments and agencies
- The longest period of sustained real growth in the Defence budget since the 1980s, as well as increased spending on dealing with global conflict.

**Legislation**

- New powers to tackle terrorism and secure successful prosecutions, including control orders, extended stop and search powers, new offences of acts preparatory, encouraging and glorifying terrorism, and training for terrorism; extended pre-charge detention; and extended proscription of terrorist organisations
- New powers for both central and local government to coordinate responses to domestic emergencies.
Chapter Two: Guiding principles

2.1 Our approach to national security is clearly grounded in a set of core values. They include human rights, the rule of law, legitimate and accountable government, justice, freedom, tolerance, and opportunity for all. Those values define who we are and what we do. They form the basis of our security, as well as our well-being and our prosperity. We will protect and respect them at home, and we will promote them consistently in our foreign policy. At home, our belief in liberty means that new laws to deal with the changing terrorist threat will be balanced with the protection of civil liberties and strong parliamentary and judicial oversight. Overseas, our belief in the rule of law means we will support a rules-based approach to international affairs, under which issues are resolved wherever possible through discussion and due process, with the use of force as a last resort. We believe that this set of core values is a potential basis for broad agreement, not just in the United Kingdom but everywhere – and that the best way to spread not just well-being and prosperity but also security, is to build a progressive coalition of governments and people in support of those values.

2.2 We will be hard-headed about the risks, our aims, and our capabilities. We will adopt a rigorous approach to assessing the threats and risks to our security, and the options for tackling them. That means being clear and realistic about our aims, and about the capabilities we and others have to achieve them. At home, our aim should be that people are able to go about their business without fear and with a reasonable assurance of safety. Some risk is inevitable, and the Government’s role is to minimise and mitigate it. We must also continually review where government can best focus its efforts, and where other sectors or countries or international institutions should be encouraged to play their part. In an increasingly interdependent world, we cannot opt out of overseas engagement. But overseas especially we need to be realistic, and set realistic expectations, about what we can achieve.
2.3 Wherever possible, we will tackle security challenges early. We are committed to improving our ability to scan the horizon for future security risks, and to developing our capabilities for preventive action. The most effective way to tackle all the major security challenges involves early engagement. The most effective way to reduce the long-term threat from terrorism is to tackle the causes of violent extremism, both at home and overseas. Similarly, the most effective way to reduce the threat posed by failed states is to support fragile states in strengthening their governance, their development and their security capabilities, and to improve the capacity of the international community to act to stop states degenerating, like Afghanistan and Somalia in the 1990s, or Zimbabwe today. The most effective way to reduce the potential security consequences of issues such as climate change and rising energy demand is to take the tough decisions now to tackle them, both as global issues in their own right and their implications for global security.

2.4 Overseas, we will favour a multilateral approach. The ultimate responsibility for our national security lies with the United Kingdom, but collective action – notably through the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) – remains the most effective way of managing and reducing the threats we face, and the only prospect of eliminating any of them completely. The threats and drivers are increasingly trans-national, and demand a trans-national response. The preparations for the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001 spanned several continents, and so did the effects: the World Bank estimated the reduction of global GDP at almost 1%. We believe that a multilateral approach – in particular a rules-based approach led by international institutions – brings not only greater effectiveness but also, crucially, greater legitimacy. And just as globalisation exacerbates the challenges, it also creates new opportunities for a multilateral response, using trading, political, social and cultural links to build wider cooperation. We believe that the current international institutions, from the UN Security Council to the World Bank, need to become more ambitious, effective and representative. We will use our established position within those institutions to work for further reform.
We also recognise that sometimes the best approach will be more flexible alliances, coalitions or bilateral relationships tailored to particular issues. The partnership with the United States is our most important bilateral relationship and central to our national security, including through its engagement in NATO. The EU has a vital role in securing a safer world both within and beyond the borders of Europe. We recognise that encouraging a more positive attitude to the United Kingdom across the world will bring lasting benefits not just to our prosperity but to our security, and that the best way to promote that is engagement at every level – government, business, civil society, education, and individuals.

2.5 At home, we will favour a partnership approach. Traditionally, the Government has been expected to deal with the threats and risks to national security through the Armed Forces, the police, border staff, and the intelligence and security agencies. Increasingly, the changing nature of the threats and risks, and our improved understanding of the best way to respond to them, demand broader partnerships. We will build on the coalition of public, private and third sectors already involved in counter-terrorism. We will work with owners or operators to protect critical sites and essential services; with business to improve resilience; with local authorities and communities to plan for emergencies and to counter violent extremism; and with individuals, where changing people’s behaviour is the best way to mitigate risk.

2.6 Inside government, we will develop a more integrated approach. The distinction between ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ policy is unhelpful in a world where globalisation can exacerbate domestic security challenges, but also bring new opportunities to tackle them. Similarly, the traditional contrast between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power obscures recent experience of post-conflict stabilisation, which shows how success in building security depends on political and economic development. More generally, the major security challenges require an integrated response that cuts across departmental lines and traditional policy boundaries. This National Security Strategy outlines some of the ways in which our approach has become more integrated, but also identifies where we need to go further – indeed its existence is a reflection of the Government’s ambition to work more closely together at home and overseas to achieve our security objectives.
Chapter Two: Guiding principles

2.7 We will retain strong, balanced and flexible capabilities. Although we accept the need to get better at predicting future threats, we recognise that shocks are inevitable. We believe that early engagement is best, but we recognise that it will not always succeed. While we believe that we must work in partnership with other sectors, we recognise that the Government has the ultimate responsibility to protect our security. And while we believe that a multilateral approach is best, we recognise that sometimes the United Kingdom has to take a lead or deal with problems itself. So we will retain strong, balanced and flexible national capabilities. For example, in relation to terrorism, although we are investing in a long-term approach to tackling the underlying drivers, we are also continuing to invest in a wide range of capabilities for dealing with the immediate threat, from intelligence to policing to greater resilience. In relation to defence, although we expect our Armed Forces to operate in most cases as part of NATO or in coalitions, we recognise that there may be circumstances in which we need the capability to respond independently. In relation to post-conflict stabilisation, we will work through the UN, NATO and EU to strengthen their capabilities and decision-making. We will also continue to develop our own world-leading capabilities in this area, including a more integrated civilian–military approach. Our worldwide network of diplomatic posts will continue to perform a crucial role.

2.8 We will continue to invest, learn and improve to strengthen our security. We believe that we have a sound approach to national security, which is stronger than a decade ago. But we recognise that we need to continue to invest and improve, to monitor the effects of our policy and actions and to learn from our experience – and we are committed to increased external engagement and public and parliamentary scrutiny to help us do so.
Chapter Three: Security challenges

3.1 However insecure we might sometimes feel in today’s fast-changing and complex world, in many ways we are more secure than most countries and more secure than at most times in our history. There is a very low risk of military attack on the United Kingdom in the foreseeable future. Our ability to forecast emergencies and catastrophic events, and reduce their impact, is improving. But the security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable, and we face a diverse and interconnected set of challenges. This chapter sets out our assessment of the major threats and risks, both immediate and longer term, and the trends and factors which drive them. Our responses are set out in Chapter Four.

Threats and risks

Terrorism

3.2 The United Kingdom faces a serious and sustained threat from violent extremists, claiming to act in the name of Islam. Although they have very little support among communities in this country, and their claims to religious justification are widely regarded as false, the threat is greater in scale and ambition than terrorist threats we have faced in the past.

3.3 Since August 2006 we have published the terrorist threat level, based on a new and more transparent assessment system. The threat has remained at the second-highest level, ‘severe’, except for two short periods during August 2006 and June and July 2007, when it was raised to the highest level, ‘critical’. 

3.4 At any one time the police and the security and intelligence agencies are contending with around 30 plots, 200 groups or networks, and 2,000 individuals who are judged to pose a terrorist threat.

3.5 Many of those networks and individuals share an ambition to cause mass casualties without warning. Some are willing to use suicide attacks, and have aspirations to use chemical, biological and radiological weapons. Those tactics are quite unlike terrorist threats we have faced in the past.

3.6 Terrorists also aspire to attack our critical national infrastructure; and to use new methods, including electronic attack.
3.7 Recent attacks and attempted attacks in the United Kingdom and on our citizens and interests overseas reflect a wider transnational trend. Since the 1990s there have been high-profile attacks in the Middle East, north and east Africa, south Asia, east Asia, mainland Europe, and the United States. There is no single chain of command or entity behind this pattern of activity. The Al Qaeda leadership, who had pretensions to fill this role, have been under pressure from international military, intelligence and police action since 2001, including the disruption of their safe havens, notably in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. It is also in the nature of the new terrorist threat that it is not a single organisation but a wider network of affiliated groups, often sharing a common ideology and outlook. The degree of structure and level of professionalism exhibited by those groups vary, but they very often work together, exploiting modern travel and communications (especially the internet) to share information, personnel and training, and to spread a common ideology – working together in ways that were not possible for terrorist groups in the past.

3.8 Other groups, including dissident Irish republican activists, animal rights extremists and others, also continue to require attention.

3.9 While terrorism represents a threat to all our communities, and an attack on our values and our way of life, it does not at present amount to a strategic threat. But it is qualitatively and quantitatively more serious than the terrorist threats we have faced in the past, and it is likely to persist for many years.

**Nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction**

3.10 Sixty years after their invention and almost 40 years after the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), nuclear weapons remain potentially the most destructive threat to global security. While the global stockpile has reduced since the Cold War, large arsenals remain. The number of nuclear-armed states has also increased, even if the NPT has helped ensure that fewer states have acquired nuclear weapons than many predicted, and some (for example South Africa and Libya) have abandoned their programmes. North Korea has conducted a test of a nuclear device and tests of ballistic missiles, and Iran continues to pursue nuclear activities in defiance of United Nations (UN) Security Council
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3.11 We judge that no state currently has both the intent and the capability to pose a direct nuclear threat to the United Kingdom or its vital interests. But we cannot rule out the risk that such a threat will re-emerge over future decades.

3.12 We also monitor: the possibility of nuclear weapons or material or technology (including commercial) falling into the hands of terrorists, who we know have ambitions to acquire it; and the proliferation of the technology behind ballistic missiles, which increases the chance of either new states or non-state actors being able to threaten the United Kingdom directly in the future.

3.13 A number of states retain the ability to produce chemical and biological weapons. Again, we do not judge that they currently pose a direct threat to the United Kingdom, but we will continue to monitor their ability to produce weapons, the development and proliferation of potential delivery mechanisms, and the possibility of material falling into the hands of terrorists.

Trans-national organised crime

3.14 Organised crime involving fraud, the trade in illegal drugs and illegal weapons, illegal immigration and human trafficking (especially of women and children), is increasing across the world. Where those activities thrive, they threaten lives and legitimate livelihoods; undermine and corrupt economies, societies and governments; help cause or exacerbate state failure, in some cases leading to civil war and violent conflict; and can directly or indirectly support terrorism.

3.15 Those phenomena are not new, but they are taking new forms and exploiting new opportunities, including revolutionary changes in technology and communications, and increased global movements of goods, people and ideas. While the effects reach down into our neighbourhoods, for example through the trade in illegal weapons and drugs, the groups and networks involved are increasingly trans-national. Governments and
international institutions are still adjusting to this shift in scale and focus.

3.16 At national level, the potential effects include: undermining legitimate cross-border trade; threatening the integrity of financial markets through large-scale money-laundering; and threatening business and individuals through cyber-crime. But to most people, the most visible manifestation of organised crime is the trade in illegal drugs. That remains a serious problem in the United Kingdom, as in most countries, despite significant progress over the last 10 years in disrupting drug networks, seizing drug shipments, expanding and improving drug treatment and educating young people about the dangers of drugs.

3.17 While the threat to the United Kingdom from serious and organised crime is assessed by the Serious and Organised Crime Agency to be high and causing significant damage to the United Kingdom, it is not the pervasive threat which it is in some parts of the world, where it has effectively undermined legitimate trade and government and the rule of law. However, even in the United Kingdom it is a serious and fast-moving threat. Organised crime groups are becoming more complex and professional and increasingly operate a portfolio approach, switching focus to wherever risk is lowest and profit highest. It is a threat which requires constant vigilance and a continuing effort to stay ahead of the criminals in adapting to new developments, both inside the United Kingdom and across the world.

Global instability and conflict, and failed and fragile states

3.18 In the last two decades, there has been a significant decline in the level of violent conflict between states. But violent conflict and serious instability persist, both between and especially within states. We are improving our ability to assess the risk of violent conflict and to act early to prevent and mediate it, but we will never be entirely successful. Prevention and mediation are not guaranteed to work, and even the best horizon-scanning will not predict every shock or conflict. Some of the major violent conflicts in recent decades, including the Falklands Conflict and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, were not adequately predicted by either the United Kingdom or any other government.
3.19 Some regions in the wider Middle East and Africa suffer from the distinct problem of violent conflicts that are individually unpredictable but collectively frequent, persistent and self-reinforcing, fuelling the proliferation of conventional weapons and preventing the progress in governance and economic development that would build long-term stability.

3.20 All violent conflicts are humanitarian catastrophes, and the United Kingdom has a moral responsibility to work with other countries and the international community to prevent, mediate and mitigate conflict, as well as contribute to post-conflict stabilisation and peacebuilding. But violent conflict overseas has implications that are not confined to the area or region in question and can directly affect national security. That is especially true of regions which are pivotal to global security, such as the wider Middle East, or which directly affect British interests, such as the Pashtun Belt straddling the border between the sovereign states of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

3.21 In the past, most violent conflicts and significant threats to global security came from strong states. Currently, most of the major threats and risks emanate from failed or fragile states. A failed state is one whose government is not effective or legitimate enough to maintain the rule of law, protect itself, its citizens and its borders, or provide the most basic services. A fragile state is one in which those problems are likely to arise. Failed and fragile states increase the risk of instability and conflict, and at the same time have a reduced capacity to deal with it, as we see in parts of Africa. They have the potential to destabilise the surrounding region. Many fragile states lack the capacity and, in some cases, the will adequately to address terrorism and organised crime, in some instances knowingly tolerating or directly sponsoring such activity. That was the situation in Afghanistan, where the Taliban regime sheltered terrorist training camps before the terrorist attacks in September 2001, and with narcotics networks in several parts of the world, for example Southern Afghanistan and West Africa.

Civil emergencies

3.22 We monitor closely the risks of infectious disease, extreme weather, and man-made emergencies. We assess that the highest risk is an influenza-type pandemic, like the outbreak in 1918 which killed 228,000 people in the United
Chapter Three: Security challenges

3.24 Because of the scale and speed of the risk they pose, those phenomena have similar potential to other security challenges to threaten our normal way of life across significant areas of the country with little warning. Moreover, our approach to them – to assess and monitor the risks, to learn from experiences at home and overseas, to develop capabilities to minimise the risks and the potential harm, and to absorb whatever harm does occur and then return to normality as soon as possible – is similar to our approach to other national security challenges, including terrorism.

State-led threats to the United Kingdom

3.25 Our assessment remains the same as in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review: for the foreseeable future, no state or alliance will have both the intent and the capability to threaten the United Kingdom militarily, either with nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, or with conventional forces.

3.26 The United Kingdom does, however, remain subject to high levels of covert non-military activity by foreign intelligence organisations. A number of countries continue to devote considerable time...

Kingdom and an estimated 20–40 million worldwide. Experts agree that there is a high probability of a pandemic occurring – and that, as the SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) outbreak showed, the speed at which it could spread has increased with globalisation. We estimate that a pandemic could cause fatalities in the United Kingdom in the range 50,000 to 750,000, although both the timing and the impact are impossible to predict exactly. The second-highest risk is coastal flooding on a scale that last took place along a thousand miles of the east coast in 1953, killing 300 people. Even with today’s improved defences, a repeat of coastal or tidal flooding on that scale could result in the flooding of hundreds of thousands of properties, and the need to evacuate and shelter hundreds of thousands of people.

3.23 Additional risks include: other forms of infectious disease (epidemic rather than pandemic); river flooding similar to during the summer of 2007, which seriously damaged or disrupted over 50,000 homes and businesses; and other forms of extreme weather, which we expect to become more frequent and more severe, as a result of climate change.
and energy to trying to obtain political and economic intelligence, and trying to steal sensitive technology on civilian and military projects. They increasingly combine traditional intelligence methods with new and sophisticated technical attacks, attempting to penetrate computer networks through the internet.

3.27 We also continue to monitor the possibility of state-sponsored terrorism.

3.28 The overall international security landscape has become more complex and unpredictable, and although the probability remains very low, over the longer term we cannot rule out a possible re-emergence of a major state-led threat to the United Kingdom. That could come about through a wider breakdown in the international order, or through the development of, for example, missile technology which rendered irrelevant the distance from a potential enemy, or other forms of threat which render distance irrelevant, for example state-sponsored cyber-attack.

**Drivers of insecurity**

3.29 In the second half of this chapter, we consider a range of factors which are not in themselves direct security threats to the United Kingdom, but which can drive insecurity, instability, or conflict. They are major global issues with implications beyond national security, and security may not even be the primary reason for tackling them. In many cases the risks to global well-being and prosperity would be sufficient in themselves to demand action. This strategy, however, focuses on the security implications.

**Challenges to the rules-based international system**

3.30 As Chapter One set out, the international landscape has been transformed, and the opposition between two power blocs replaced by a more complex and unpredictable set of interests, groupings and relationships. Alongside that shift in the geopolitical landscape, a range of economic, technological and social trends, often grouped under the heading ‘globalisation’, are increasing the interconnectedness and interdependence between economies, societies, businesses, and individuals. That generates new opportunities to work together to build not just a more prosperous world but a more secure world, based on shared economic interests and a shared commitment to strengthening international institutions and a rules-based approach to dealing with disputes.
3.31 Overall, there is a good case for saying that international institutions are stronger than ever. The UN has adapted to many changes in the international landscape since it was set up 60 years ago. Since the end of the Cold War in particular, its membership has acted with greater vigour in discharging its responsibilities for security. Observers have attributed a significant part of the reduction in global conflicts over this period to greater UN engagement: there was a six-fold increase in UN-led preventive diplomacy missions between 1990 and 2002, and there has been a seven-fold increase in the number of UN peacekeepers in the field over the last 10 years, with over 100,000 peacekeepers now deployed in an expanded range of situations. There are also positive signs at the regional level, with the emergence of security communities where strong, rules-based regional institutions, often built on shared economic interests, are increasingly playing a role in regional security and reducing the risk of violent conflict. The most obvious examples are the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the European Union, both of which have expanded their membership and their role in recent years, but there is potential in other areas, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and, over the longer term, the African Union.

3.32 Despite those positive signs, the international security architecture has yet to adapt satisfactorily to the new landscape. The UN Security Council has failed to adapt to the rise of new powers. Across all the key institutions, the level of ambition in the face of new challenges remains too low, and the response to crises too slow. As well as notable successes, there have been high-profile failures, including Rwanda and frustration over Darfur. The pressure on international institutions is likely to grow, most acutely with new challenges in the areas of climate change and resource competition. Pressure will also grow because in a multi-polar world, international institutions will be expected to bear more of the weight in responding to security challenges, at the same time as demands for reform will increase.

3.33 How the international system responds to those pressures, and in particular how well it succeeds in entrenching the rules-based approach to resolving disputes and dealing with states that violate international laws and norms, will be one of the most significant factors in both global security and the United Kingdom’s national security over the coming decades.
Climate change
3.34 Climate change is potentially the greatest challenge to global stability and security, and therefore to national security. Tackling its causes, mitigating its risks and preparing for and dealing with its consequences are critical to our future security, as well as protecting global prosperity and avoiding humanitarian disaster.

3.35 The impact of climate change is already being felt, in higher global temperatures and changed weather patterns. Climate impact models will increasingly help us understand the likely path of further change over coming decades, at regional and national level.

3.36 Rising sea levels and disappearing ice will alter borders and open up new sea lanes, increasing the risk of territorial disputes. An increase in the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events – floods, droughts, storms – will generate more frequent and intense humanitarian crises, adding further stresses on local, national and international structures. Rising temperatures together with extreme weather will increase pressures on water supplies.

3.37 Many of those changes will affect the United Kingdom directly, but the direct effects are likely to fall most heavily on those countries least able to deal with them, and therefore most likely both to suffer humanitarian disaster but also to tip into instability, state failure, or conflict. That further increases the responsibility of the international system to generate collective solutions. While the possibility of disputes may increase, climate change also presents new opportunities to strengthen international cooperation; but if the international system fails to respond, the effect on its credibility would have further knock-on effects on security.

Competition for energy
3.38 Global demand for energy is likely to continue increasing, especially with the growth of emerging economies such as China and India. Barring revolutionary developments in alternative energy, the competition for energy supplies will also increase. On present projections, global energy demand will be more than 50% higher in 2030 than today, at the same time as the supply of oil and gas becomes increasingly concentrated, much of it in regions with potential for political instability. Increasing urbanisation will put much of the developing world in the same position as the
developed world, with large cities relying on energy supply from far away. The premium attached to energy security, and the rising risk of energy shortages, will increase the potential for disputes and conflict. Countries including China and Russia are already making control of energy supply a foreign policy priority.

3.39 Like climate change, competition for energy is a global challenge in its own right, but also one with potentially serious security implications. Along with climate change and water stress, it is one of the biggest potential drivers of the breakdown of the rules-based international system and the re-emergence of major inter-state conflict, as well as increasing regional tensions and instability.

**Poverty, inequality, and poor governance**

3.40 Poverty, inequality, lack of economic development and opportunity, and poor governance are all highly correlated with insecurity and instability, both in individual countries and across regions.

3.41 Worldwide levels of absolute poverty are falling, helped by economic growth, increased trade and overseas aid. These welcome trends are set to continue. But there are still over two billion people living on less than a dollar a day, with the biggest challenges for poverty reduction being in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. Poverty in turn increases vulnerability to infectious disease: the incidence and death rates of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria are all highest in sub-Saharan Africa. The picture on inequality within states is mixed, and inequality between states is increasing. Together, poverty, disease, and inequality can undermine political and economic development, fuel instability, increase the risk of violent conflict, and create grievances which can be exploited by violent extremists.

3.42 The single biggest positive driver of security within and between states is the presence of legitimate, accountable and capable government operating by the rule of law. Its absence – because of dictatorship, state-sponsored violence, weak, ineffective or corrupt government, or civil war – both exacerbates the immediate threats outlined above, and undermines the capacity to respond to them.

3.43 Recent decades have witnessed the further spread of democracy, with authoritarian regimes being replaced by democratically elected governments across
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continued development, and a more equal distribution of its benefits, is – alongside strengthening the rules-based international system – the best route to future peace and security. As a trading nation committed to remaining at the forefront of technological advances, the United Kingdom is well placed to benefit from globalisation, but has a clear interest in monitoring and addressing the related challenges and vulnerabilities.

3.46 The first set of challenges and vulnerabilities is economic. Last year, total United Kingdom imports and exports were over £750 billion (or about 55% of GDP), and 95% of our visible international trade is reliant on shipping. Business and consumers increasingly benefit from global supply chains, and from our status as a global hub for business and travel. Our success in exploiting those opportunities contributes to high levels of employment and standards of living, and to international influence. But it relies on a relatively benign international environment, and requires us to consider our vulnerability to risks to open markets and global financial stability, and potentially to physical threats to global supply chains.

3.47 The second set of challenges and vulnerabilities is technological. As

southern and eastern Europe, east Asia, parts of Africa, and Latin America. Over the long term, we can expect that, with the support of the United Kingdom and other countries, and institutions such as the European Union and the UN, democracy will continue to spread, and governance to improve, with resulting benefits for global security as well as for well-being and prosperity. But it will be a long and uneven path, and dictatorship, corruption, weak or absent government, and civil war will remain a feature of the landscape over the coming decades.

3.44 In a number of countries in the wider Middle East and Africa, the prevailing political system remains autocratic, with strong internal security agencies but poor governance and limited popular participation. In some, the political system is facing the new challenge of the entry into politics of militia movements associated with violence and violent extremist ideology, including Hezbollah and Hamas. These movements have combined violence with being the de facto providers of welfare to large parts of impoverished populations.

Global trends

3.45 Globalisation brings huge benefits, to security as well as prosperity. Ensuring its
economies and societies grow increasingly dependent on national and global electronic information and communication systems, it becomes even more important to manage the risk of disruption to their integrity and availability through cyber-attack, whether terrorist, criminal, or state-led. Diversity of systems can provide resilience, but can also lead to increased complexity and interdependence, making the whole more vulnerable to attacks or accidental shocks.

3.48 The internet in particular offers individuals, business, third sector groups, and governments a wide range of new opportunities ranging from fast and reliable financial transactions to new ways of keeping in touch with friends. The internet is itself a trans-national, fast-changing and loosely-governed entity, but is also part of our critical national infrastructure. It is both a target and an opportunity for hostile states, terrorists and criminals. Some are intent on destroying the infrastructure itself; others on exploiting the internet’s trans-national, fast-changing and loosely-governed nature to conduct illegal activity.

3.49 The third set of challenges and vulnerabilities is demographic. The world’s population is expected to grow from 6.2 billion today to 9.5 billion in less than 50 years. The trend towards urbanisation is set to continue, with the proportion of the global population living in cities rising from under 50% in 2000 to over 60% in 2030, accelerated by the pressures of climate change and the pull of employment in cities linked to the globalising world economy.

3.50 A growing and increasingly urbanised global population will increase demand for food and water, at the same time as climate change and other trends put greater pressure on their supply. Already well over a billion people suffer from water shortages, and 30 countries get more than a third of their water from outside their borders. With climate change, those figures are likely to grow, increasing the possibility of disputes. Climate change will also add to the pressure on food supplies, through decreased rainfall in many areas, and climate-related crop failures. Increasing wealth will further increase demand for food: the United Kingdom is leading international efforts to reduce the numbers of people living on less than a dollar a day, but we must recognise that this will increase the global demand for meat and dairy products, and further increase overall demand for grain. We should
A rising and increasingly urbanised population can also have more immediate effects on stability. The largest-ever generation of teenagers is reaching working age in poor countries where unemployment is already high. When this development is combined with factors such as rapid urbanisation, political exclusion, and a lack of basic services and economic opportunity, they present risks of increased political instability, disorder, violent conflict and extremism. Over the next decade these conditions will come together in countries in the most fragile regions of the world: the wider Middle East, south Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa.

Global migration is driven both by wider demographic pressures, and by the economic aspects of globalisation. According to UN statistics, the number of people living outside their country of birth more than doubled from 75 million to 191 million between 1960 and 2005. The number continues to increase, particularly in developed countries. Migration brings major economic benefits. In destination countries, it supports economic growth and labour market flexibility. In source countries, it generates remittances from migrant workers, which the World Bank estimates are now twice the total of global aid. The openness of economies and societies is one of the major drivers of long-term stability and security. A negative global reaction to migration and a move towards closed economies and societies would increase overall risks. But the global movement of people also brings challenges for security: including identifying, among these increasing flows, those individuals who are security threats; and managing the effects on infrastructure and social cohesion of large and relatively rapid inflows of people.

The interdependence of threats, risks and drivers

There are a number of common strands running through the threats, risks and drivers outlined in previous sections. The first is their trans-national nature; the second, the prominence of non-state actors. In part those result from the absence of an immediate state-led threat to the United Kingdom,
which leads us rightly to focus elsewhere; and in part they reflect wider trends, including globalisation. The third theme is their interdependence. Understanding those interdependencies is critical to adapting our responses, for example: the potential links between terrorism and organised crime (for example in Afghanistan); the ability of both to subvert governments or economies and cause state failure; the links between state failure and regional conflict, or between nuclear proliferation and regional conflict; and the link between the strength of the rules-based international system and the potential re-emergence of a major state-led threat to the United Kingdom.

3.54 That interdependence also applies to the underlying drivers of insecurity; and it is highly complex and dynamic. Economic shocks can tip fragile societies and economies into state failure. Regional conflicts can exacerbate tensions over energy supply. The combination of demographic pressures, such as urbanisation and the growing proportion of young people, with political exclusion and a lack of economic opportunity, can create a vicious circle of economic crisis, food insecurity, political crisis, and violent extremism – feeding through into state failure or increased migration, and reinforcing continuing poverty. Poverty increases instability and the risks of conflict, increases both the likelihood and the effect of acute resource competition, and can be a driver of migration. Finally, climate change and related effects on water, energy and food security will multiply other threats and interact with other drivers of insecurity, including demographic pressures and the spread of disease.

3.55 The complex and unpredictable interaction of those multiple stresses will increase the pressure on social, economic and political structures, particularly in those countries least able to cope, and therefore most likely to tip into instability, conflict or state failure. That is likely to apply most acutely in parts of Africa and the wider Middle East, where so many of the stresses identified above are present together.

3.56 The constructive implication to be drawn from the close relationship between the threats, risks and drivers of insecurity, is that there are important synergies between our policy responses. Our investment in responses to new threats, such as cyber-attack, will potentially help us in responding to a wide range of different hostile actors
– from terrorist networks to trans-national crime networks, and from non-state actors to foreign states. In development policy, those parts of Africa and the wider Middle East which have suffered from a vicious circle of poverty, poor governance, and conflict, need integrated international engagement across security, governance and economic development. The interdependence between different drivers means that some of the policy trade-offs we seem to be faced with are in fact false choices: for example, just as it is wrong or short-sighted to talk of a choice between economic development and environmental protection, so too it is wrong to talk of a choice between security and economic development, or security and good governance.

3.57 The complex interdependence of the threats, risks and drivers of insecurity, in an increasingly interconnected world, is in itself a powerful argument for a single overarching strategy for national security. This strategy focuses on the full range of issues, pulling together expertise and experience across government to produce a coherent response to the global security challenges of the twenty-first century. That is what Chapter Four addresses.
Chapter Four: The United Kingdom’s response

4.1 This chapter follows the same structure as Chapter Three, outlining our response across government to each of the major security challenges.

Counter-terrorism

4.2 Since 2001, we have significantly enhanced our capability to deal with the terrorist threat to the United Kingdom and to our citizens and interests overseas. We have worked to integrate our approach across Government, to develop partnerships outside government, and to enhance cooperation overseas – with the United States, Europe, and the Commonwealth, with governments across the Islamic world, and with multilateral organisations.

4.3 Chapter One summarised recent changes to bring greater integration to our approach, through the establishment of the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, the multi-departmental Research, Information, and Communications Unit, and the cross-government Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism, which has responsibility for implementing our cross-government counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST.

4.4 CONTEST is an integrated approach based on four main workstreams each with a clear objective:

- **Pursue**: stopping terrorist attacks
- **Protect**: strengthening our protection against attack
- **Prepare**: mitigating the impact of attacks
- **Prevent**: stopping people becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism

4.5 **Pursue** includes: covert intelligence and police work to detect and disrupt the current terrorist threat, continuing to work to strengthen our legal framework to ensure successful prosecutions of terrorist crimes through our criminal justice system – or, where appropriate, deportations; proscription of terrorist groups and exclusion of dangerous individuals; information-sharing with our allies and partners to support counter-terrorist operations overseas; capacity-building with our allies and partners; and our work as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in support of the legitimate government in Afghanistan to deprive terrorist networks of their sanctuaries.
4.6 **Protect** includes: work with partners in the private sector and local government, and others to improve the protection of our critical infrastructure, hazardous sites and materials, and crowded places (including cinemas, theatres, pubs, nightclubs, restaurants, hotels and commercial centres, hospitals, schools and places of worship); work with architects and planners to ‘design-in’ safe areas, and blast-resistant materials and enhanced physical protection against vehicle bomb attacks; and work at our borders and with international partners to improve our ability to track and intercept foreign terrorist suspects, and British suspects travelling to terrorist training camps overseas.

4.7 **Prepare** includes: work to improve resilience at national, regional and local level – with the Government, the police and emergency services operating in partnership with the private sector, local government, and others to ensure that our communities are prepared for a terrorist attack and able to mitigate its consequences and return to normal life as quickly as possible; as well as capabilities to handle attacks on British citizens and interests abroad.

4.8 **Prevent** includes: work to challenge the ideology behind violent extremism and to support the voices of the peaceful majority; action to disrupt those who promote violent extremism, and to support communities and institutions (for example, mosques, colleges, universities, and prisons) in developing strategies to resist it; giving advice and support to young people and their families to resist recruitment to violent extremism; and addressing grievances exploited by those who promote terrorism, for example highlighting our positive work overseas, including support for the Middle East peace process, to challenge the violent extremist narrative.

4.9 The work of Prevent will only succeed with the active participation of the widest cross-section of society, including central government, voluntary and community groups, regional and local government, policing, the education and youth sector, faith groups, and the arts and media. It means ensuring that we empower local authorities, institutions and communities to deliver local solutions to local issues.

4.10 Like all parts of CONTEST, Prevent applies at home and overseas, including co-operation with individual countries to challenge and resist violent extremism, to
reduce its impact on communities in the United Kingdom, and to address grievances. In taking the strategy forward we will focus on those countries and regions which have the most influence on the ideology behind violent extremism and which have the most connections to communities in the United Kingdom. We will also encourage the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), and Commonwealth to do more in this area.

4.11 Across all four strands of CONTEST, we will continue to learn, adapt, and invest. As set out in Chapter One, the resources dedicated to counter-terrorism and intelligence have more than doubled, from £1 billion in 2001 to £2.5 billion today, generating a major increase in our capability, including new regional police counter-terrorist units. Resources will continue to grow, with planned increases up to £3.5 billion by 2011, including a further £240 million for counter-terrorist policing, and additional growth in the Security Service taking its strength to double 2001 levels; improvements to our ability to monitor and analyse violent extremism; and additional investment in the long-term challenge of tackling violent extremism and promoting greater understanding – with £70 million at home and £400 million overseas over the next three years.

4.12 Our work to strengthen our borders and related work on the National Identity Scheme will also help in disrupting terrorist travel and restricting the use of false and multiple identities by terrorists. The Armed Forces will maintain their contribution to counter-terrorism at home and overseas. We will continue to build closer links between our counter-terrorist effort and related programmes, including military and civilian activities in Iraq and Afghanistan; our approach to proliferation; protection against electronic attack; and work to address poor governance, poverty and inequality, which can combine with other factors to become drivers of extremism, and which terrorist groups exploit in their propaganda.

4.13 Our approach to tackling terrorism is hard-headed about our aims and capabilities. Given the nature of the terrorist threat, success requires more than effective security and intelligence work, vital though that is. In particular the work of Prevent, to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism, requires challenge to deep-seated ideas and grievances as well as immediate threats, something that cannot be done by the Government alone, though we will continue to coordinate, drive, and fund it.
4.14 Our overall response to terrorism seeks to preserve both our security and the core values on which our society depends – values that are shared by the overwhelming majority living in the United Kingdom. The current terrorist threat can itself be seen as an attack not just on us but on those values, including human rights, the rule of law, justice, freedom, tolerance, and opportunity for all. We need to respond robustly, bringing those involved to justice while defending our shared values, and resisting the provocation to over-react. At home, we will continue to prosecute terrorists through the criminal justice system wherever possible, updating our legislation where necessary to take account of the evolving nature of the threat. Overseas, where we detain terrorist suspects, our treatment of them will be subjected to the most demanding level of scrutiny by the International Committee of the Red Cross. We have made clear that we are committed to working with the United States to close its detention facility at Guantánamo Bay.

4.15 The threat from terrorism is real and, as noted in paragraph 3.9, more serious than those we have faced in the past, and likely to persist for many years. But we must also keep it firmly in perspective. While we will continue to make the necessary changes to respond to the evolving terrorist threat – in strategy and policy, structures, resources, and legal powers – we are also determined to maintain the balance of security and liberty, and above all to maintain normal life, whether at airports, on the train or underground networks, or in our communities.

**Countering terrorism – future priorities include:**

- delivering the Government’s Public Service Agreement – to ‘reduce the risk to the United Kingdom and its interests overseas from international terrorism’;
- continuing to build our capability to detect and disrupt terrorists, in the United Kingdom and overseas, through investment in the police and the security and intelligence agencies;
- enhancing the protection against terrorism provided by new border technology and the new UK Border Agency;
- increasing our capacity to deal with the consequences of a terrorist attack;
- delivering the improved range of projects and programmes to tackle violent extremism, including working with partners overseas; and
- addressing grievances and challenging the violent extremism narrative, for example highlighting our active support for the Middle East Peace Process.
Chapter Four: The United Kingdom’s response

Countering the threat of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction

4.16 Our approach to the threat of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is fully integrated across Government, with cooperation across departments and agencies including the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Ministry of Defence (MOD), the Home Office, the security and intelligence agencies, the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR) and Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC). It links to other national security activity, including our wider foreign policy efforts to reduce tensions in regions where there is a risk of conflict that could lead to the use of such weapons, such as the Middle East and south Asia; and to counter-terrorism. Terrorist networks have made no secret of their desire to acquire and use chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. We have a comprehensive strategy to try to stop them succeeding.

4.17 Our approach to proliferation reflects our commitment to act early to reduce future threats, our commitment to multilateralism and the rules-based international system, and our willingness to work with partners beyond government, including the private sector. It is based around four strands:

- **Dissuade** states from acquiring, developing, and contributing to the spread of WMD, and related materials and expertise.

- **Detect** attempts by states, and terrorists, to develop or acquire this capability.

- **Deny** access to WMD and the necessary materials, equipment, technology, and expertise to develop them, while promoting commerce and technological development for peaceful purposes.

- **Defend** our country, our citizens, our Armed Forces and our strategic interests from the threats posed by proliferation.

4.18 In all those strands, we will focus especially on failed and failing states, countries that pose a direct threat to our core values, and regions facing security challenges.

4.19 **Dissuade** includes: continuing to support and enforce targeted UN and EU sanctions against states not complying with their obligations, while holding out the prospect of improved economic and political
relations if those obligations are met. Specifically, we will continue to support the ‘E3+3’ process (France, Germany and the United Kingdom plus China, Russia and the United States) in relation to Iran, and the Six-Party Talks in relation to North Korea. We will press for early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, including completion of its verification system; seek agreement to start negotiations without pre-conditions on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty; and continue to support the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as the cornerstone of the international community’s approach. In the run up to the 2010 NPT review conference, we will lead the international effort to accelerate disarmament among possessor states, in pursuit of our objective of a negotiated elimination of all nuclear weapons. We have offered to host a technical conference for the five NPT Nuclear Weapons States on the verification of nuclear disarmament. We will also continue to encourage the United States and Russia to see their current bilateral discussions as an opportunity for further reductions. Our own plans to make a further 20% reduction in our operationally available warheads to fewer than 160, less than half the planned level in 1997 – which we announced alongside our 2006 decision to maintain our deterrent – are now complete.

4.20 **Detect** includes: identifying, collecting and assessing information on attempts by proliferator states and terrorists to develop, acquire or use CBRN weapons; supporting the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), other relevant international agencies, and their inspection regimes; and using our security, intelligence and law enforcement capabilities to target proliferation networks and financing. An important element of our ability to deter state-sponsored terrorism is our capability to determine the source of material employed in any nuclear device. We will retain and strengthen our world-leading forensic capability in this area and we will also continue to work to strengthen international expertise in this field.

4.21 **Deny** includes: working to strengthen control regimes on proliferation-sensitive materials, principally through the tightening of international export controls, but also strengthening the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards, and ensuring universal implementation of relevant conventions such as the International Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials; strengthening the capacities of the IAEA
Chapter Four: The United Kingdom’s response

and failing states or terrorists, through strengthening codes of conduct and export control regimes, and improving the international monitoring architecture.

Countering the threat of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction – future priorities include:

- continuing to address international concerns about Iran’s nuclear programme, notably through support for the E3+3 process; and supporting the Six-Party Talks in relation to North Korea;
- achieving a positive outcome from the 2010 NPT Review Conference;
- pushing hard for early agreement on a new IAEA-led system to help states secure fuel for new civil nuclear power programmes, including through a uranium enrichment bond, in return for firm commitments to non-proliferation;
- starting negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty and securing the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty;
- working with domestic and international partners to reduce the risk from nuclear terrorism; and
- maintaining the effectiveness of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

4.22 Defend includes: maintaining our independent nuclear deterrent, based on our 2006 assessment that we cannot rule out a nuclear threat to the United Kingdom re-emerging over the next 50 years. We will continue to equip our Armed Forces to operate in a CBRN environment, and maintain our capability to deter states from directly sponsoring terrorists.

4.23 We adopt a similar integrated, multilateral approach to tackling chemical and biological weapons. We will work to strengthen international conventions and to press possessor states to meet the agreed 2012 deadline for the destruction of chemical weapons; strengthen the international verification regime; work with experts to minimise the risk of misuse of commercial material; and seek to reduce the risk of CBRN material, including commercial material, falling into the hands of failed and failing states or terrorists, through strengthening codes of conduct and export control regimes, and improving the international monitoring architecture.
**Tackling trans-national organised crime**

4.24 Trans-national organised crime poses a challenge to traditional policing approaches: it crosses borders; it links up the local, the national and the trans-national; it requires close cooperation between policing and intelligence; and it cuts across traditional departmental boundaries between policing, transport, security, and finance.

4.25 With over 14,000 more police officers than 10 years ago, we have a policing capability with the strength to deal with organised crime at the national level, through the regional and force level, down to the neighbourhood level. The formation of SOCA in 2006 and the introduction of the new UK Border Agency, both working closely with the police, reflect our commitment to an increasingly integrated approach. The 25,000 staff in the agency will have new powers to address a wider range of risks and threats, together with new capabilities including fast-response patrol craft for intercepting illegal activity in territorial waters. Freight, including lorries and sea containers, will continue to be screened by the United Kingdom’s border staff at home and at selected ports overseas, to prevent clandestine entry of goods or people. In conjunction with our strengthened border capabilities, the National Identity Scheme will provide a robust defence against those who seek to use false identities to conceal criminal as well as terrorist activity.

4.26 We are also working with the EU and member states to ensure effective cross-border cooperation to tackle international organised crime, strengthening Europol and Eurojust, the European bodies that facilitate cooperation between police and judicial bodies; developing new systems to ensure the rapid and secure exchange of information including DNA records, vehicle information, foreign criminal records, stolen goods, and passenger data; and speeding up the extradition of criminals, and the identification, tracing, freezing and confiscation of their assets.

4.27 We are shifting the emphasis to tackling problems at source, building the capacity of overseas governments to tackle organised crime. For example, we deploy customs officers to the Caribbean and West Africa to stop drug ‘mules’ boarding flights to the United Kingdom; and our worldwide network of airline liaison officers targets trans-national organised crime as well as
terrorism and immigration fraud. Current multilateral projects include the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) and the Royal Navy working in the Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre in Lisbon with six other partner countries, to interdict drug-trafficking from South America. The Centre pools the intelligence and naval and coastguard assets of the European countries on the Atlantic seaboard and has intercepted large shipments of cocaine bound for the United Kingdom and other European countries.

4.28 We are focusing our resources better, mapping the activity of organised crime groups more systematically to understand the scale, cost and impact of their activities, and to provide an improved basis for targeting them. We are adapting Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements – first developed to deal with dangerous sexual and violent offenders – to target organised crime. Finally, we are alert to new threats, including cyber-crime, and wider effects, including the guns that are brought to the United Kingdom and end up in the hands of young people in our cities, or the organised trafficking of women and children into the sex industry.

Trans-national organised crime – future priorities include:

- giving law enforcement bodies the powers and support they need to make the United Kingdom an increasingly hostile environment for organised crime;
- increasing our recovery of organised criminal assets;
- enhancing our targeting of trans-national organised crime at our borders; and
- improving data-sharing through the EU, UN, and G8 to identify and pursue trans-national criminal networks.

Tackling global instability, conflict, and failed and fragile states

4.29 Our response to global instability, conflict, and failed and fragile states brings together a wide range of government activity, from diplomacy to development to overseas military operations. We favour early engagement, to prevent conflict developing or spreading and to tackle threats to our national security at source. Wherever possible we will adopt a multilateral approach, ideally through international
institutions. And we are committed to a more integrated approach including the links to other areas of our National Security Strategy, including counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation.

4.30 The United Kingdom accepts a responsibility to contribute across the full range of activity, and we have capabilities and experience to offer in each area. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and a member of the EU, NATO and the Commonwealth, we often play a key role in shaping immediate international responses to instability and conflict. We support a wide range of interventions, with funding and military and civilian staff. As part of our long-term commitment to these challenges, we are building our own national capabilities, and encouraging and supporting regional partners and the international community to do the same.

4.31 Our approach can be separated into the following three broad areas. First, political support. By its nature, political support is not available or measureable as military or financial support: it is often discreet and generally intangible. But it is also highly effective in identifying and tackling emerging problems, and it is an area where the United Kingdom has a strong international reputation. It includes monitoring human rights problems, and mediating political grievances which can prefigure conflicts; promoting the role of women in building peace and reconciliation (including through UN Security Council Resolution 1325); conflict mediation and management, including behind-the-scenes engagement with parties, brokering talks, using international levers to bring parties towards agreement, and securing peace agreements; and, giving political support and direction to post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction, including working towards political inclusion and more permanent resolution of grievances. In Kenya, for example, that means supporting reforms to help move beyond the ‘winner takes all’ politics that was a major contributory factor in the recent violent crisis. More widely it means advocating and helping deliver the ingredients of long-term healthy societies, from the rule of law, civil society and legitimate, accountable and effective government. In the Middle East, it means making clear that political participation by militia groups must be based on a clear direction of travel away from violence. And where the situation requires peace enforcement or military intervention, it means recognising that this will only deliver
The longer-term challenge of security sector reform – building up the capacity of other countries to deliver their own security in a more effective, accountable and sustainable way – is often a prerequisite for political and economic progress out of conflict or state failure, and an insurance against regression. It includes a specific focus on trans-national and organised crime, which is a particular challenge in many countries emerging from conflict, but it also requires a broad focus on building national and local security capacity, including armed forces, police, and border forces, providing security for citizens as well as for the state, and helping to build effective and accountable justice systems, from courts to prisons.

Second, economic support. As leading supporters of the World Bank, and other development-focused international financial institutions, as well as through our own development programmes, the United Kingdom helps to support the processes of economic and social development that are critical to the long-term prevention of violent conflict. We also recognise the crucial role played by economic development in an integrated approach to post-conflict stabilisation.

Third, security support. Wherever possible, international peacekeeping and peace enforcement should be carried out in partnership with local forces, both because this is the likeliest route to success, and because local consent for international forces taking a security lead is likely to be time-limited. In Afghanistan, for example, we are currently playing a leading role in international efforts to increase the capacity of the Afghan security forces.

4.32 The United Kingdom is a leader in promoting and supporting security sector reform, and we are making a substantial investment in this area as part of our capacity-building in a wide range of countries and regions. In Sierra Leone, we have supported the development of the Office of National Security, which played a vital role in ensuring a free, fair and peaceful political transition in the recent Presidential elections. We support the African Union (AU), and advocate joint training exercises with the EU or NATO. We run military
exchange programmes and support military training colleges, and we will build up a similar approach in policing by identifying and deploying more officers to act as mentors, advisers and leaders in international police assistance missions, and supporting exchange programmes and mentoring of police colleges.

4.36 The final element of security support is countering the proliferation of conventional weapons, which is a major driver of conflict and instability. We are committed to effective implementation of export controls at national level, and recently announced an extension of controls to cover brokering of small arms by British citizens overseas. We will also assist other states to develop and implement the governance mechanisms needed to ensure tough controls on arms transfers, and we will continue to play a leading role in pressing internationally for a legally binding Arms Trade Treaty, including by supporting the UN-convened Group of Governmental Experts. We have taken a leading role in working towards a ban on cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians, last year withdrawing our two types of dumb cluster munition with immediate effect.

4.37 As well as continuing to drive activity and capacity-building across all three areas of political, economic, and security support, we recognise the common themes. In particular, the best chance of success in tackling and managing the linked challenges of instability, conflict, and failed and fragile states comes from acting early, wherever possible in a multilateral way, and as part of a fully integrated approach.

4.38 Early engagement limits the spread of instability and conflict, addresses threats to our national security at source, and ultimately saves both lives and money. Early engagement will not always be enough. Not all security problems are predictable. Even where they are, action will not always be possible, either because of conditions on the ground or because of a lack of available resources. Where action is possible, it will not always be successful. So we need the ability to respond swiftly and decisively across the full range of intervention scenarios, not just to prevent or mediate violent conflict, but also to stabilise situations in or emerging from violent conflicts, and to support recovery and reconstruction. In all those scenarios, we need to recognise that there are no quick fixes; that strategic patience
is essential; and that we must be clear and realistic about what success looks like – we must not be too ambitious, and we must be sensitive to local needs and local solutions.

4.39 Across all those scenarios, we also need to recognise the extent to which success depends on early and continuing analysis and understanding. Intervention without sufficient preparation can be unsuccessful or even counterproductive. We will continue to strengthen our national analytical capacity for early warning and strategy development, enabling us to focus on building regional and country expertise where and when it is most needed. We will work with allies and international security institutions to do the same. We will also strengthen our capacity to monitor the effects of our actions, and more systematically learn the lessons of our experience in recent years in the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan, the Middle East, Africa and elsewhere, to improve our capacity to make a constructive contribution to future challenges.

4.40 Multilateral engagement, ideally through international institutions, is crucial both to allow the international community to draw on the full range of political, economic, and security resources at the disposal of different countries, and to provide the legitimacy on which effective action demands. Multilateral working brings its own challenges, including issues with burden-sharing (for example in Afghanistan) and speedy decision-making (for example in Darfur). We advocate a clearer set of criteria for a range of international interventions, and a clearer and faster system for agreeing UN-assessed contributions. We will work with the EU to make continued good use of the EU’s Africa Peace Facility and to create a predictable and sustainable EU mechanism for funding UN-authorised AU missions, including their ability to deploy quickly.

4.41 Finally, as our experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has shown, building stability out of conflict or state failure is a complex undertaking which requires concerted, sustained, and integrated effort across security, politics and governance, and economic development. Economic development cannot happen in the absence of basic security or effective governance, but nor can improvements in security and governance be sustained without broad-based economic development.
4.42 That was set out clearly in the United Kingdom’s new strategy for Afghanistan announced in December 2007. To ensure that longer-term political and economic objectives are the guiding force behind the security campaign, we have brought British civilian and military personnel together into a co-located headquarters – and we will continue to strengthen their integration, working together and with the Afghan government on security, the rule of law, tribal reconciliation, and basic services such as roads, wells, schools and hospitals. We have set out clearer and more realistic objectives, and we are building closer partnerships between NATO and Afghan security forces.

4.43 In Iraq, unlike Afghanistan, our forces are no longer in a leading security role, but they continue to contribute to security by training and mentoring Iraqi security forces, and maintaining ‘overwatch’. That is explicitly designed to support the political and economic efforts on national reconciliation and development, and our priority of working in partnership with the Iraqi government, Iraqi business and international business to unlock the economic potential of Basra.

4.44 The operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have demanded extraordinary courage from individuals and great commitment from a wide range of units across the three Services. Their ability and readiness to carry out this difficult work, the professionalism they have shown and the international regard in which they are held, are rightly a source of national pride. Our experience in Afghanistan in particular has reinforced our view that security threats, including terrorism, are best tackled early, at source. It has also reinforced the premium on forces that are deployable and flexible, able to move rapidly between different environments and different types of operations; and our belief that the most demanding expeditionary operations are likely to be conducted alongside US forces, either in coalition or in a NATO context, and that if we wish to be able to continue to make a significant contribution to such operations, our Armed Forces will need to be capable of operating closely with US forces.

4.45 Some aspects of our operational experience since 2003 were not fully predicted, including the enduring nature of the operations and the particular premium on certain kinds of capability, including protected patrol vehicles, battlefield support helicopters,
Chapter Four: The United Kingdom’s response to make them available for multilateral deployment. To support greater integration on the ground, we have established a new £269 million Stabilisation Aid Fund and the Stabilisation Unit, jointly owned by DFID, the FCO and the MOD. The British Embassy in Afghanistan, our largest, embodies the new joint way of working, with an integrated and inter-agency approach – with diplomatic, political, governance, economic and financial, developmental, cultural, security, military and British Council staff co-located and working together on agreed objectives.

We are looking at increasing the number of civilian staff in Afghanistan, and at strengthening the capacity within the armed forces to work alongside civilians for certain specific, short-term reconstruction and development tasks in hostile environments, and to provide a stabilisation presence in the immediate aftermath of a military operation while sufficient security is put in place to enable civilians to deploy. Our review of Reserve Forces will include an examination of how reservists might contribute most effectively in those situations.

4.46 Elsewhere in the world, the United Kingdom’s military forces and civilian stabilisation staff have a less visible and front-line role, but we are part of an international effort pursuing the same objectives and encouraging the same integrated approach. For example, as part of our commitment to supporting security and economic stability in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, we have committed up to £243 million over three years, linked to tangible progress in peace negotiations, including progress on reform and the easing of movement and access restrictions.

4.47 To improve integration at the multilateral level, we will work to ensure that the UN delivers its commitment to genuinely integrated missions, and support the UN Peacebuilding Commission, which works to ensure integrated effort by all donors on strategy and delivery, and to provide immediate support for post-conflict reconstruction. We advocate the development of a stronger international capacity, including through the EU and UN, to deploy civilian stabilisation experts, including judges, lawyers and police, at short notice and in larger numbers and to make them available for multilateral deployment. To support greater integration on the ground, we have established a new £269 million Stabilisation Aid Fund and the Stabilisation Unit, jointly owned by DFID, the FCO and the MOD. The British Embassy in Afghanistan, our largest, embodies the new joint way of working, with an integrated and inter-agency approach – with diplomatic, political, governance, economic and financial, developmental, cultural, security, military and British Council staff co-located and working together on agreed objectives.

We are looking at increasing the number of civilian staff in Afghanistan, and at strengthening the capacity within the armed forces to work alongside civilians for certain specific, short-term reconstruction and development tasks in hostile environments, and to provide a stabilisation presence in the immediate aftermath of a military operation while sufficient security is put in place to enable civilians to deploy. Our review of Reserve Forces will include an examination of how reservists might contribute most effectively in those situations.

4.48 We are increasing spending on addressing global conflict through pooled funding arrangements managed jointly by the FCO, DFID and the MOD, recently
establishing a single Conflict Prevention Pool with £327 million funding over the next three years.

4.49 In summary, we will continue to fulfil our responsibilities to contribute to the full range of international efforts to prevent, mediate, and manage violent conflict, and to recover and rebuild after conflict. We will develop our national capabilities to do so; we will ensure that all these capabilities – military and civilian, security and development – are fully integrated to deliver effect in risky or hostile environments; we will work to encourage partners and allies to invest in the same capabilities; and we will work for greater effectiveness in the UN, EU and NATO to enable more timely and integrated responses to the linked challenges of conflict, instability and failed and failing states.

4.50 We recognise that we have finite resources and capabilities to achieve our aims. We are, therefore, committed to a clearer focus and more hard-headed prioritisation, bringing together our defence, diplomacy and development resources in a unified approach, and focusing on countries or regions where the United Kingdom has a particular ability to help (for example through historic links, or close links between diaspora communities and countries overseas), where the opportunities to make a difference are most apparent, where the humanitarian needs are greatest, or where our national interest is most clearly at stake.

4.51 Based on those criteria, our current national security priorities overseas are:

- Pakistan and Afghanistan: key priorities for regional conflict prevention as well as domestic counter-terrorism;
- those parts of Africa suffering from conflict, including Darfur, or extremism, including North Africa;
- the Middle East, including Iraq, because of its key role in global security and stability, and its totemic status among violent extremists; and
- Eastern Europe, where we support enlarged European structures.
Global instability and conflict, failed and fragile states – future priorities include:

- delivering the Government’s Public Service Agreement on conflict to “reduce the impact of violent conflict through enhanced United Kingdom and international efforts to prevent, manage and resolve it”;
- building the capacity of weak states and regional organisations to prevent and resolve conflicts;
- building international capacity for peacekeeping and security sector reform;
- strengthening British and international ability to deploy civilians;
- increasing civilian–military integration; and
- continuing international action towards the Millennium Development Goals.

Planning for civil emergencies and building resilience

4.52 Our response to the various kinds of emergencies described in Chapter Three emphasises early action – in horizon-scanning and effective risk assessment, so that we are not caught unawares; in seeking to prevent emergencies arising in the first place; and when they do, in minimising harm and then returning to normality as soon as possible, working in partnership with all who have a role to play, across the public, private, community and third sectors; as well as working internationally to address the underlying causes.

4.53 Since 2001, the Government has mounted a sustained effort to improve the resilience of the United Kingdom to all types of risks. The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 set out the responsibilities of front-line responders to assess local risks and publish them in community risk registers; to prepare plans; to make arrangements to warn and inform the public in the event of emergencies; and to promote business continuity. We provide guidance to local responders and emergency planners on how to carry out their duties under the Act, for example on how to plan for a flood or an evacuation, and how to identify vulnerable groups. We have set up a nationwide network for resilience, coordinated by the Cabinet Office.
We will continue to strengthen those capabilities across the country, as well as devoting additional effort to a number of specific priorities identified in paragraph 3.22.

On flooding, we are investing in better weather forecasting, including forecasting of precise local impact, and increasing expenditure on flood management from £600 million in 2007/08 to £800 million in 2010/11. The scale of the risk posed by coastal or tidal flooding has the potential to exceed even that posed by the fluvial and surface water flooding of last summer. So we will consider carefully the recommendations of the Pitt Review, as part of a programme to reduce the risk and impact of all sources of flooding, working with the private sector to reduce the vulnerability of critical sites and services.

On pandemics, the World Health Organization (WHO) has recognised the United Kingdom as being in the vanguard in preparing for a pandemic and we will continue to improve our capacity to minimise the potential effects of a pandemic including ensuring that effective planning is in place at regional and local levels across the country.

We will also work closely with international bodies to reduce the risk of a pandemic and build the capacity to respond if it materialises. That will include engaging WHO and other global health bodies, the UN, the EU, the World Bank, and individual countries, on the coordination of international surveillance requirements and on early warning systems; on analysing and preparing viruses for vaccine and research purposes, on increasing vaccine supply; on planned responses; including coordinated travel restrictions; and on support to vulnerable countries to help them develop their capabilities, where the United Kingdom has already pledged £37 million.

The Government alone cannot protect people from all the consequences of natural disasters. Human and social resilience, often at the community level, will continue to be crucial to ensuring British citizens' future security and well-being.

The British people have repeatedly shown their resilience in the face of severe disruptions whether from war, terrorism, or natural disasters. Communities and individuals harness local resources and expertise to help themselves, in a way that complements the response of the emergency
services. That kind of community resilience is already well organised in some parts of the United Kingdom, and we will consider what contribution we can make to support and extend it, building on the foundations of the Civil Contingencies Act and on the lessons of emergencies over the past few years.

4.60 Wider knowledge of the risks described in Chapter Three will enable communities to prepare better. We will therefore publish in summer 2008, and on a regular basis thereafter, a national-level risk register setting out our assessment of the likelihood and potential impact of a range of different risks that may directly affect the United Kingdom, and the safety and well-being of its citizens. That will help local authorities, communities, businesses, and others in preparing for emergencies. It will be updated annually and informed by longer-term national assessment of related climate change effects and risks.

4.61 The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 will continue to provide the framework for all of this work, and the Government will review whether the Act needs strengthening, drawing on lessons identified in its first three years of operation and, looking ahead, examining whether there are areas where the legislative or regulatory framework can be improved.

Planning for civil emergencies and building resilience – future priorities include:

- continuing to increase expenditure on flood management in England, from £600 million in 2007/08 to £800 million in 2010/11, and taking forward the recommendations of the Pitt Review;
- continuing to build domestic capacity to respond to an influenza pandemic;
- continuing to build the extensive network of organisations engaged in preparing for and responding to domestic emergencies;
- publishing a national-level risk register covering the full range of risks; and
- reviewing the Civil Contingencies Act to ensure an effective legislative and regulatory framework.

Defending the United Kingdom against state-led threats

4.62 While for the foreseeable future no state or alliance will have both the intent and the capability to pose a major and direct threat to the United Kingdom, we cannot
rule out a possible re-emergence of such a threat in future decades.

**4.63** We will need to safeguard the United Kingdom against the re-emergence of such a threat, to defend the territory of the United Kingdom, its sea and air approaches, its information and communications systems, and its other vital interests, including our Overseas Territories.

**4.64** The foundation of our strategy for preventing the re-emergence of such a threat, or deterring it should it re-emerge, is our continued commitment to strong bilateral defence and security relationships, our leading role in NATO and the EU and other key alliances, a strong counter-proliferation regime, and reformed global institutions, including the UN.

**4.65** Ultimately, we must also continue to guard against the re-emergence of a state-led threat through maintaining strong national capabilities.

**4.66** On intelligence, in addition to the major effort required to tackle the current level of terrorist threat, the security and intelligence agencies will continue to protect the United Kingdom against covert activity by foreign intelligence organisations aimed at political, economic and security targets, including cyber-attack. The agencies are committed to working with the FCO and MOD, and other relevant parts of government, to monitor the nature of this threat.

**4.67** On defence, in 2006 we decided to maintain our independent nuclear deterrent because, while we are strongly committed to multilateral nuclear disarmament and to the global elimination of nuclear weapons, we cannot rule out a threat to the United Kingdom involving nuclear weapons re-emerging over the next 50 years.

**4.68** To help mitigate the threat of weapons of mass destruction, we welcome US plans to place further missile defence assets in Europe to provide cover for allies. We already contribute to ballistic missile early warning and regularly discuss continuing support with the United States. We are also working closely with allies on the development of NATO missile defence options. We strongly support efforts to include Russia through a joint regional missile defence architecture, not least to provide reassurance on the defensive nature and intent of that capability.
4.69 We remain committed to maintaining strong conventional forces capable of deterring and responding to a range of state-led threats. The challenge is to invest in the right capabilities to safeguard the United Kingdom’s security for the long term, while at the same time – as set out above – continuing to give priority to supporting our forces currently on overseas operations.

4.70 We will continue to favour capability over quantity. The proportion of the United Kingdom’s defence spending dedicated to high-technology equipment is high by international standards. As a result, the capability of a given aircraft, ship, or infantry unit far outstrips that of even 10 years ago, and that of most conceivable adversaries. We are determined to shift the overall balance of defence procurement towards support of current operations, building on recent additions to strategic airlift, support helicopters, protected patrol vehicles, surveillance and personal equipment. But we will also continue to invest for the long term in a broad range of military capabilities. Those include assets such as the recently announced aircraft carriers, and capabilities related to the defence of the United Kingdom, including air defence and anti-submarine warfare – capabilities that would be difficult to rebuild from scratch if the relevant threats should re-emerge in the future. We retain this broad range of capabilities and this high-technology approach to safeguard our ability to prevent and deter aggression, reinforcing our membership of NATO and our commitment to the international system.

The Armed Forces
The operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and in particular their enduring nature, have stretched the Armed Forces and placed great demands on service personnel. Their resilience and capability to meet current and future challenges is not in doubt: they continue to perform superbly in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and demonstrably retain the capacity to deal with emerging crises, such as the evacuation of Lebanon, and the ability to deploy to Kosovo if required. But we are entering a phase of overall reduced commitments, recuperation of our people, and regrowth and reinvestment in capabilities and training as much as equipment.

(continued)
A crucial element of this will be improving the support we give to members of the Armed Forces and their families. We have made significant improvements over recent years, including improved pay, a new tax-free operational bonus paid from the Reserve, greater access to home ownership schemes, and an extension of priority treatment to all veterans in the NHS. But we are determined to do more, and the Command Paper announced in November 2007 will set out proposals for a new cross-government effort to improve the support we offer in education, healthcare, accommodation, and the treatment of injured personnel. We will also set out new retention measures to help bring military numbers back into balance.

Those longer-term objectives must be combined with the immediate imperatives of safety and success on current operations; and – as with every area of national security – these competing priorities have to be reconciled within finite resources. The Defence budget has had the longest period of sustained growth since the 1980s, and will see further real growth to 2010-11. We have the second-highest defence budget in the world in cash terms, and the fifth-highest in purchasing power terms (after the United States, China, India, and Russia). In the last year, we will have spent up to £2.9 billion in addition to the defence budget in Iraq and Afghanistan, of which nearly £1 billion was for equipment. But acute cost pressures remain in certain areas. There are a number of factors behind that including real pay increases and rising fuel costs. But the primary factor is the rising cost of defence equipment. The Royal Air Force is currently taking delivery of new generation Typhoon fast jets, which cost over £50 million each – at least twice the cost in real terms envisaged when the programme began in the late 1980s. Similarly, the new Type 45 destroyers, the most capable ships ever fielded by the Royal Navy, cost over £1 billion each – again twice the cost in real terms envisaged when the programme began in the late 1990s. The combination of the rising costs of defence equipment, our commitment to capability over quantity, and the recent high operational tempo undeniably presents a significant challenge, which is shared with all developed countries with major military commitments. As made clear above, we are determined to shift the overall balance of defence procurement towards support of current operations, while at the same time continuing to invest in a broad range of capabilities for the long term. To deliver that in a challenging environment, we are reforming the approach to defence procurement and our relationship with the defence industry, with more hard-headed prioritisation and a greater emphasis on value for money.
Strengthening and reforming the international system

4.71 As set out in Chapter Two, we are committed to a multilateral, rules-based approach to international affairs, where issues are resolved through discussion and due process, with the use of force as a last resort. We also accept, as set out in paragraph 3.32, that the rules-based international system itself faces important challenges which global and require effective global responses. Too often, the existing international system lacks that capacity. A key element of our response is therefore strong support for international institutions and a rules-based approach, while also actively supporting a wide range of reforms to build open, credible, accountable and effective global institutions, and equip them with the capabilities they need.

4.72 Stronger international financial institutions, particularly the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, are essential to deal with the changes brought by globalisation, and to sustain a framework for global economic stability, growth and open markets, which is one of the most important drivers of security and stability. We will work within these institutions to adapt their governance structures to the new global economic realities, to provide surveillance to prevent world economic crises, and to enable fast economic recovery and growth after conflict.

4.73 We will continue to build close bilateral relationships with key countries, including the United States, and the emerging powers of India and China. The partnership with the United States remains our most important bilateral relationship, and central to our national security. India is the world’s largest democracy, and shares with us in one of the most profitable bilateral trade partnerships in the world. Its political role is growing within its own region and internationally. It is making an increasing contribution to international cooperation against terrorism, and continues to contribute a large number of international peacekeepers. China is already the fourth-largest economy in the world, a major trade partner, and a growing world power. Many of the security challenges we face will not be solved without Chinese engagement: for example achieving a durable settlement in Darfur and reform in Burma, denuclearising the Korean Peninsula, as well as issues such as climate change, energy competition, food and water pressures, and poverty and good governance. Both bilaterally and at the EU
level we are engaged in a dialogue with China on a range of issues; in many of those areas we have seen tangible recent evidence of China exercising its influence in support of objectives we share. We still have some fundamental differences, including over human rights, and we make these clear in our dealings with China. But the new global realities mean that engagement with China is not an option but a necessity.

4.74 We will continue to press for a more representative and credible G8, and for the expansion of the permanent membership of the UN Security Council to include India, Brazil, Germany, and Japan, as well as permanent African representation – to enable both those bodies to provide stronger and more credible leadership in world affairs. If the deadlock over permanent reform continues, we will consider an intermediate solution.

4.75 We will continue to press for further strengthening and reform of international institutions to deliver the specific objectives on conflict prevention, mediation, peacekeeping and peace enforcement, stabilisation, and peacebuilding. We are committed to building a better rules-based framework for intervention across all those scenarios. In particular, we need a stronger UN system for protecting vulnerable populations, preventing state breakdown and the descent into violence, building peace, and laying the foundations for longer-term development. In some circumstances the international community has a responsibility to help countries protect their populations. In most cases, that involves support for the countries’ own security forces and agencies; but in some cases, where a government is unwilling or unable to protect its citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity, or is perpetrating these acts itself, the international ‘Responsibility to Protect’ ultimately requires the international community to act.

4.76 We will support reforms that build international capacity in this area, including delivering the UN’s commitment to genuinely integrated missions; ensuring that the Peacebuilding Commission takes on an effective leadership role in shaping longer-term peacebuilding; and developing a stronger international capacity, in the UN and EU, to deploy civilian stabilisation experts at shorter notice and in larger numbers. We will work for greater formal international support
getting people with the right skills, expert capabilities and management abilities into positions that will help the institutions deliver effectively and efficiently against their objectives.

4.81 We will continue to promote and support the spread of democracy, and improvements to make governance more effective, legitimate, and accountable, by working through international institutions (including election monitoring), through British and international aid and economic policy (discussed below), and through broad support for civil society and free media.

4.82 This programme of reform is not something that can be achieved by the United Kingdom or any other country acting alone. It will require a broad coalition – a broad range of actors in global society working together, from international organisations and states through to businesses, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and global foundations. The United Kingdom, with its open economy, innovative business sector, and vibrant civil society is well placed to play a key role in this new kind of international coalition.
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Strengthening international institutions – future priorities include:

- leading further reform of the G8, UN Security Council, IMF, and World Bank;
- strengthening NATO, including enlargement and better arrangements for burden-sharing;
- strengthening UN and EU capacity to ensure better international approaches to conflict prevention, mediation, stabilisation, recovery and peacebuilding;
- improving international peacekeeping funding mechanisms; and
- building the capacity of regional security institutions, including the AU.

Tackling climate change

4.83 As set out in Chapter Three, climate change is likely to have serious consequences for international stability and security, and an integrated and international response is urgently needed to tackle cause and effect.

4.84 That includes defensive measures such as greater protection against flooding and sea level surges; modifications to plans for development and the management of resources, such as increased water efficiency, and changes to agricultural crops and practices to mitigate water stress and food insecurity; and changes to energy policy to tackle the causes of climate change, achieving a reduction in global carbon emissions and meeting rising global energy demand in a sustainable way.

4.85 We are working at all levels – from our role in the international community and the EU, to national level, local authorities and communities, and in partnership with businesses and citizens – to make the technological and behavioural transition to a low-carbon economy. The United Kingdom has a leading role to play in multilateral efforts to tackle climate change, including helping to set binding, ambitious commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. We are working to develop the global carbon market; to scale up the climate change and clean energy frameworks of the World Bank and other development banks; to strengthen UN institutions working on climate change; build capacity in developing countries to introduce adaptation policies at national and local level; and, in the immediate future, to secure a global
agreement by 2009 on a comprehensive framework of climate change commitments for the period after 2012.

4.86 To address the effects on security, we are undertaking a systematic detailed analysis, region by region, of how the impact of climate change is likely to affect the United Kingdom; analysing our water and food security issues to ensure sustainable and secure supplies; and increasing our overall investment in climate change research to at least £100 million over the next five years to investigate the dynamics of long-term climate change, the links to international poverty and the impact of climate change on conflict and other factors.

**Tackling competition for energy and building energy security**

4.87 We have an integrated strategy designed to ensure secure and reliable energy supplies; to reduce our vulnerability to security shocks elsewhere; to reduce our contribution to tensions arising from competition for energy resources; and to tackle climate change.

4.88 That includes working through the EU and bilaterally to promote open, competitive energy markets, and working closely with other states to encourage clear, stable and non-discriminatory rules and effective regulation of the market, to ensure that energy is produced in the most efficient way and to encourage adequate investment. We will work through the EU and global institutions to develop a competitive global gas market and thereby increase the security of our gas supply. That will include specific engagement with key countries, such as Russia (the world’s largest producer of gas, supplying half of EU imports), through the range of international mechanisms. Holding Russia to the G8 St Petersburg energy commitments is crucial to ensuring that it is a stable supplier and full contributor to international efforts to tackle climate change.

4.89 Our energy strategy also includes diversifying the sources of primary fuels and the routes by which they can be imported. The United Kingdom gas market is in the process of investing £10 billion in a new gas import and storage infrastructure. It also includes shifting to a low-carbon economy, both in the United Kingdom and across the world: promoting policies to improve energy efficiency; increasing supplies from renewable sources; and putting a value on carbon emissions, enabling low-carbon
technologies to compete with other forms of energy production. At home, we are also encouraging investment in nuclear facilities (although this has security implications of its own).

**Tackling poverty, inequality, and poor governance**

4.90 We are committed to leading international efforts to tackle poverty, raise living standards, and promote development across the world. This reflects our core values and has important benefits for national security.

4.91 We have increased our overseas development budget from 0.26% of gross national income in 1997 to just over 0.5% in 2006, and are committed to meeting the UN target of 0.7% (or over £10 billion a year) by 2013. We have brought greater transparency and effectiveness to the way that money is spent. British aid is now lifting three million people out of poverty a year worldwide, and we are significantly increasing expenditure on education (£1 billion a year by 2010), and on global health.

4.92 As well as financial aid, we are supporting reforms to international trade that open up markets to the poorest countries, and using our position in the EU and G8 to argue for a pro-development outcome to the Doha round of world trade negotiations. Along with international partners, we are committed to delivering the Millennium Development Goals by 2015.

4.93 Those actions are based not just on our commitment to global justice, but on a recognition that they also make an essential contribution to building long-term security, given the links between, on the one hand, poverty, inequality, and lack of development and, on the other, instability, insecurity, conflict, and failed and failing states. With the United Kingdom’s aid contribution growing in size and effectiveness, we are also looking at the ways in which our overseas aid policy contributes to the security of the citizens’ countries and regions concerned, and also to our own national security. As the development budget increases, and our understanding of the long-term links between development and security deepens, we are increasingly using our development resources to tackle poverty and raise living standards in key regions, countries and provinces at risk of instability, conflict or state failure, including Pakistan and Afghanistan (including assistance in delivering basic services in the North West Frontier Province...
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and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas), parts of Africa, and the wider Middle East.

4.94 Our approach includes long-term support for more effective and accountable governance and security and justice systems, complementing more immediate support. A significant part of our bilateral development assistance is channelled through national and sub-national governments, and we devote substantial resources to improving the quality of governance in developing states. In Afghanistan, we are working with the Independent Directorate of Local Governance and the Civil Service Commission to help improve the planning and financial management of provincial and district governors. We also recognise the importance of ensuring that political reform does not lead to domination by any ethno-national or sectarian group, supporting reform efforts that ensure that minority groups and regions have an adequate political voice.

4.95 We will continue to play a leading role in wider international efforts to fight corruption, having committed £120 million over five years through the Governance and Transparency Fund. Through initiatives such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, and in partnership with business and NGOs, we are working to build new multilateral regimes to help ensure that mineral revenues contribute to economic development, political stability and security, rather than undermining them.

Responding to global trends

4.96 We are committed to ensuring that the world as a whole, not just the United Kingdom, can benefit from the opportunities of globalisation and contribute to dealing with the related security challenges.

4.97 Our approach will be similar to that outlined throughout this strategy: a commitment to acting early, scanning the horizon for possible future threats; to working with partners in business and elsewhere; and to putting our effort and assets – whether research, enforcement, or diplomatic – behind a multilateral, rules-based approach.

4.98 In response to economic challenges, we recognise the links between financial stability and security, and support broad reform of international financial institutions. Alongside other EU nations, we will continue to push for operational improvements, including better surveillance activities by the
IMF to provide early warning of economic turbulence, and better arrangements for enabling economic recovery and growth after conflict or in regions susceptible to conflict. We are committed to multilateral efforts to protect legal economic activity against disruption or attack, whether electronic attack, money-laundering, or piracy. The Royal Navy maintains a presence in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf, to contribute to international work to protect vital sea lanes and choke points against a range of threats, from terrorism to piracy and potential state-sponsored disruption.

4.99 In response to the technological challenges, we are committed to working with international, public, and private sector partners to ensure that our government systems and critical national infrastructure are adequately protected against cyber-attack. We are also investing, through the interception modernisation programme, to update our intelligence and law-enforcement capability to meet the challenges of rapidly advancing communications technology. We are committed to maximising the opportunities and benefits of the internet, by protecting the freedom to develop and host new services, while also reducing the scope for terrorists and criminals to exploit those opportunities and freedoms, and ensuring that the internet itself is resilient enough to withstand attacks and accidents. Finally, we support international efforts to monitor and protect the safety and security of new technology including the internet and communications networks, and the space assets that are increasingly important for communications. We will continue to explore how new confidence-building and arms control measures might contribute to international security in this area.

4.100 In response to the demographic challenges and related pressures on food and water, we will support international efforts to manage global migration, to manage water demand, and to liberalise agricultural trade and increase water-efficient food production. In our work with developing countries, for example in support of good governance and adapting to climate change, we will focus on states and regions most likely to be affected by the combination of rapid urbanisation, high unemployment, demographic shifts, instability, and a possible further growth in violent extremism.
Chapter Four: The United Kingdom’s response

The interdependence of threats, risks and drivers – an integrated response

4.101 As set out in Chapter One, the overall objective of this National Security Strategy is to anticipate and address a diverse range of threats and risks to our security, in order to protect the United Kingdom and its interests, enabling its people to go about their daily lives freely and with confidence, in a more secure, stable, just, and prosperous world. Chapter Three explains that those threats and risks are not as great as at previous times in our history, but they are real, and also more diverse, complex, and interdependent than in the past. The policy responses outlined in this chapter are, therefore, not only individually vital to our future security and prosperity, but also wide-ranging, complex, and, crucially, interdependent. They reflect an integrated approach to developing policy and building capability, intended to deliver results against a number of linked objectives.

4.102 Our development policy reflects our values – our commitment to global justice – and our recognition that development makes an essential contribution to building long-term security, given the links between, on the one hand, poverty, inequality, and lack of development, and on the other, instability, insecurity, conflict, and failed and failing states. Over the next three years, we will increase our development and security assistance to fragile states and regions where the links between insecurity, conflict, and poverty are strongest.

4.103 Our climate change and energy policies reflect the combined goals of mitigating climate change, maintaining a secure and reliable energy supply, and, in so doing, contributing to greater security and stability in international relations.

4.104 Our approach to international institutions recognises the interdependencies between financial stability and growth, and insecurity and conflict; and our belief that our response to all the challenges outlined in this strategy requires an international framework that is effective, representative, and accountable.

4.105 On capabilities, the programme of work to improve resilience – shared across all levels of government, the emergency services, the private sector, and the third sector – will improve our ability to ensure that we can minimise or absorb harm and return to normality as soon as possible, in the face of a wide range of risks and emergencies.
4.106 The Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) was established in 2007 to act as an interdepartmental organisation providing advice on information, physical and personnel security to businesses and organisations across the national infrastructure. CPNI works closely with the private sector, delivering advice to reduce the vulnerability of critical infrastructure to terrorism and other national security threats.

4.107 The flexible, global network of diplomatic posts will continue to play a crucial role in delivering the United Kingdom’s foreign policy. It provides and supports essential cross-government services, including security to the British public and businesses. It also supports the cross-government efforts described in this strategy, including bilateral and multilateral cooperation on counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation, tackling trans-national crime and dealing with conflict; reform of international institutions; and work to address the underlying drivers of insecurity. Engagement with the public in other countries is also crucial. Britain has a long tradition of public diplomacy, and we will build on that with new approaches, tailored more to individual countries and to new media.

4.108 Our commitment to strong, balanced, flexible, and deployable Armed Forces safeguards the future security of the United Kingdom, and enables us to make a significant contribution to international efforts on peacekeeping and peace enforcement. That capability, and our demonstrable political will to deploy it, also makes a wider contribution to global security, reinforcing international pressure to deter aggression and encourage participation in mediation and dialogue.

4.109 Strong borders are essential to protect against terrorism, crime, and illegal immigration. Over the last five years, the airline liaison officer network has stopped nearly 180,000 suspect travellers boarding planes to the United Kingdom. British immigration controls in France and Belgium prevent thousands of people entering the United Kingdom every year, and we are increasing support for the operational activity of the EU’s border agency, Frontex. The UK Border Agency will bring together, in one organisation, the work of UKvisas, the Border and Immigration Agency, and the border work of HMRC, improving the protection
that border and migration controls provide against terrorism, trans-national organised crime, and illegal immigration. Alongside the new border force, electronic border controls – which will begin to be rolled out later this year – will create a modern, intelligence-led border control and security framework. 100% of visas to enter the United Kingdom are already based on fingerprints. By 2011, 95% of those entering or leaving the country, whether British or foreign, will be electronically checked against watch lists for terrorism, crime, and illegal immigration, as well as being counted in and out of the country; 100% coverage will be completed by 2014.

4.110 Within the UK, the National Identity Scheme will improve protection against organised crime and terrorism. From late 2008, compulsory fingerprint biometric identity cards will be introduced for foreign nationals; and in the second half of 2009, identity cards will be issued to people employed in sensitive roles or locations, starting with airport workers.

4.111 From strong borders, to capable and flexible Armed Forces, a global diplomatic network, focused security and intelligence agencies, and a coherent approach to policy development across government, our efforts in all those areas are designed to deliver against a wide range of complex and interdependent security challenges, now and in the longer term.

4.112 In all those areas, we are committed to partnership working – across different parts of government, with the private sector and civil society, with increasing roles for communities and individual citizens, and through coordinated action with our allies and through multilateral institutions.

4.113 Together, that adds up to a balanced and coherent overall policy and capability framework for addressing both the immediate and longer-term threats and risks, and for influencing the underlying drivers of the security landscape in a direction conducive to both national security and global stability. It represents a truly integrated approach to national security which is grounded in our values, is realistic and hard-headed about what our capabilities can achieve and where they should be targeted to make the most difference, and is dedicated to the overarching national security objective set out at the beginning of this strategy.
Chapter Five: Working together

5.1 The 2007 Comprehensive Spending Review set out the Government’s spending plans for national security: continued rising real-terms investment in the Armed Forces; increased resources for diplomatic engagement in key areas; more spending on conflict prevention and stabilisation; and more spending on security, intelligence and counter-terrorism, where the budget has doubled since 2001 and will grow to £3.5 billion by 2011. This strategy sets out the framework for targeting those resources.

5.2 The recent improvements in national security structures summarised in Chapter One have brought greater focus, responsiveness and integration to our approach. Given those reforms, this strategy does not propose further radical structural change. But our structures and processes will be kept under review, and we will continue to respond and adapt to new challenges. We will, therefore, as Chapter Four states, publish a national-level risk register in summer 2008 which will be regularly updated.

5.3 We will continue to seek ways to work more effectively across government. The Cabinet Secretariats are currently being reviewed to examine whether improvements can be made to the way they are organised and work together, to deliver greater coherence and effectiveness across government, including support for the Cabinet Committee on National Security, International Relations and Development.

5.4 We will consider: how to strengthen the Government’s capacity for horizon-scanning, forward-planning and early warning to identify, measure, and monitor risks and threats; and our capacity for strategic thinking and prioritisation, spanning traditional boundaries between domestic and foreign policy, defence and security, and intelligence and diplomacy.

5.5 Building on recent experience at home (for example on counter-terrorism) and overseas (for example in Afghanistan, where security, policy and development officials now work together in joint teams), we will
continue to seek greater integration and responsiveness at the operational level. The new Stabilisation Unit will have a key role.

5.6 The Government is committed to a dialogue with experts, stakeholders, and the public, to build a shared understanding of the security challenges we face, and what we are doing and need to do to tackle them. We will encourage interested parties to contribute to the debate on the strategy, and will seek to encourage the participation of a much wider circle of expertise in addressing national security issues. We will establish a national security forum, including people from central and local government, politics, academia, the private and third sectors, and other bodies, as well as people with relevant security experience. We will also look for opportunities to seek views from members of the public. This strategy marks the next step in a process of engagement designed to ensure that government thinking on national security constantly keeps pace with the rapidly evolving global security environment.

The contribution of individuals and communities to national security

Individuals have an essential role to play in national security. We can all contribute, for example by being vigilant against terrorism, and by planning for, and taking a more active role in responding to, civil emergencies, on the basis of new and improved information on the risks we face. We can also play our part in tackling the longer-term challenges, such as climate change. Through volunteering and dialogue we can also make sure that the values we share across society are upheld.

For more information about how individuals can prepare themselves, see:

- www.mi5.gov.uk for the current threat level;
- www.fco.gov.uk for travel advice; and
- www.preparingforemergencies.gov.uk for information on emergencies.
5.7 We will publish an annual update on the challenges we face and progress on implementing this strategy. We will consult all Parties and the Parliamentary authorities about how Parliament can play a stronger role in overseeing the development and implementation of this strategy. We have recently concluded a consultation to consider the ways in which Parliament should be involved in decisions relating to the deployment of the Armed Forces into conflict.

5.8 This National Security Strategy shows that the Government is committed to working with the whole of society, to build confidence in our core values, our shared approach, and our strong security capabilities. It sets out a new and clearer understanding of what security means and how we need to work together in an integrated and coherent national and international effort. That will enable us to work together to manage risks, harness the opportunities of globalisation, and achieve the single overarching national security objective set out at the beginning of this strategy: protecting the United Kingdom and its interests, enabling its people to go about their daily lives freely and with confidence, in a more secure, stable, just and prosperous world.

**Strengthening our national security structures – future priorities include:**

- consulting on a joint Parliamentary National Security Committee to help monitor the implementation and development of this strategy;
- strengthening the work of horizon-scanning and forward planning;
- strengthening the capability to offer a strategic perspective on security priorities and improve connections between defence, development, foreign and domestic security strategies;
- creating a national security forum, including representatives from government, politics, academia and others, to discuss strategy and exchange ideas; and
- publishing the National Risk Register (as set out in Chapter Four) and an annual update on the security challenges facing the United Kingdom and progress on implementing the strategy.
Endnotes

1 The wider scope of issues to be addressed within this strategy is not to be taken as affecting the legally understood meaning of national security.

2 Although national security matters generally are the responsibility of the United Kingdom Government and Parliament, some areas of policy covered in this document are the responsibility of devolved administrations and legislatures. In these cases decisions will ultimately be for the devolved institutions concerned. In the European context, the Lisbon Treaty makes it clear that ultimate responsibility for our national security lies with the United Kingdom.

3 There are five threat levels: low, meaning an attack is unlikely; moderate, meaning an attack is possible, but not likely; substantial, meaning an attack is a strong possibility; severe, meaning an attack is highly likely; and critical, meaning an attack is expected imminently.