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11 July 2006

Responsibility to Protect Engaging Civil Society

Web: www.responsibilitytoprotect.org

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In this issue: Darfur, Uganda, UN Small Arms Review Conference



List of Articles:



I. Darfur


1. THE CLOCK TICKS: SUDAN HEADS FOR DISASTER (R2P reference)

2. NO PROTECTION FOR DARFUR FROM 30 SEPTEMBER --AU TO PULL OUT

3. NO END IN SIGHT TO DARFUR'S MISERY

4. DARFURS FRAGILE PEACE

5. HIGHLIGHTS AND ANALYSIS FROM CITIZENS FOR GLOBAL SOLUTIONS: REPORT OF THE ICC PROSECUTOR ON DARFUR TO THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL



II. Updates from Around the World

1. THE SECRET GENOCIDE--Uganda (R2P reference)

2. UGANDAN GOVT FINALIZES EMERGENCY PLAN FOR WAR-RAVAGED NORTH



III. Small Arms Review Conference

1. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE AIMED AT STRENGTHENING GLOBAL EFFORT AGAINST ILLICIT SMALL ARMS TRADE ENDS WITHOUT AGREEMENT ON FINAL DOCUMENT
2. Secretary-General disappointed small arms conference ended without agreement, but says Global Community committed to action plan to curtail illicit trade







I. Darfur



1. THE CLOCK TICKS: SUDAN HEADS FOR DISASTER

The Times (London)

James Smith

11 July 2006


A countdown of less than 90 days has begun until the vulnerable people of Darfur are abandoned by world leaders who cannot make a decision -whether to protect them or leave them at the mercy of a Government that has killed at least a quarter of a million and driven millions more from their land. The scene is set for the world's worst humanitarian crisis to tip from bad to worse.

The head of the African Union mission to Darfur, Baba Gana Kingibe, has said it is willing to hold the fort in Darfur until the end of the year. But if there is no date soon for the UN to deploy troops in Darfur, then the African Union mission will not wait; the 7,000 African soldiers will be pulled out on September 30.

()To achieve this, the mission must have a strong enough mandate. Most peace support operations are under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This will allow them to disarm and, if necessary, engage the Janjaweed. It would be preferable, and in everyone's interests, for the Sudanese Government to co-operate. So far though, Khartoum has categorically rejected UN intervention, calling it colonial invasion. Sudan cannot have it both ways: they have not stopped the violence, yet they don't want an outside force to do it.

At the World Summit in September 2005, leaders declared that "The international community...has the responsibility...to help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity." They also stated: "We are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner...should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations."

Peaceful means are clearly inadequate and the national authorities in Sudan are manifestly failing to protect their populations. With time ticking toward a disaster that could dwarf the 1994 carnage in Rwanda, the UN Security Council must fulfil its duty and exercise its authority to sanction the deployment of a protection force, with or without Sudan's consent.

James M. Smith is chief executive of the Aegis Trust www.aegistrust.org



Full text: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,6-2264085,00.html



2. NO PROTECTION FOR DARFUR FROM 30 SEPTEMBER --AU TO PULL OUT

AllAfrica.com

7 July 2006



Because World leaders cannot make a decision on Darfur, the little protection there is for civilians in this western region of Sudan will be gone in three months.



Ambassador Baba Gana Kingibe, Head of the African Union Mission in Darfur, confirmed yesterday that contrary to widespread media reports, the AU will pull its troops out of Darfur on 30 September unless Sudan gives its consent for a transition to a UN force.



Addressing mistaken reports that the AU had now decided to stay on to 31 December, he added, "What could have been misunderstood as a change of that date to the end of the year is the address given by Kofi Annan, in which he requested that the African Union should consider extending its mandate to 31st December. But at the end of the day, 30th of September was retained."



Full text: http://allafrica.com/stories/200607070851.html



3. NO END IN SIGHT TO DARFUR'S MISERY

The Economist

6 July 2006



An African Union meeting again fails to help mop up Africa's bloodiest mess.



DESPITE a peace deal signed in Nigeria in May between the Sudanese government and some of the Darfur rebels, hopes for an end to the continuing misery in western Sudan were dampened last week at a summit meeting of Africa's leaders in the Gambia. The Sudanese government is still refusing, despite earlier indications to the contrary, to allow a beefier UN peacekeeping force to take over from the faltering African Union (AU) one in Darfur.



() The trouble is that, back home in Khartoum, Mr Bashir has little room for manoeuvre. He has made big concessions to the south Sudanese, who have been fighting for autonomy (or more) for most of the past three decades and now look set to achieve it, so he cannot be seen to give away much to the rebels in Sudan's western region of Darfur as well. To do so would risk a furious backlash from Sudan's powerful military and intelligence services, who fear the country's fragmentation and possibly their own future conviction in an international court for the mass killings in Darfur. It has been suggested that UN-enforced economic sanctions may be a way to force Mr Bashir and his government to back down, but they would probably be vetoed by China, now the main importer of Sudan's oil.



The African summiteers did, however, achieve something by agreeing to extend the AU force's mandate from the end of September until the end of this year.*



After that, no one seems to know what to do. Morale among the UN people involved in Darfur is low. The UN's special representative, Jan Pronk, admits that the peace agreement signed in May needs adjusting. Even if the Sudanese government did let a UN force in, it is unclear who would contribute to it, though it is understood that its troops would be drawn mainly from African and Arab countries.



But governments such as Tanzania's, which has sounded keen to provide some men, say they will not send them to Darfur without a durable agreement.



Meanwhile, the Sudanese government is sitting tight--and the killing in Darfur goes on.



*This article was published before the announcement that the AU mandate will in fact expire on September 30 and not at the end of the year.



Full text: http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=7141936&fsrc=nwl (subscription required)





4. DARFURs FRAGILE PEACE

OpenDemocracy.com

Alex de Waal
5 July 2006

The collapse of the Darfur peace agreement designed to resolve the conflict in western Sudan could be averted by a more comprehensive approach to the key issue of disarmament, says Alex de Waal.

The implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) signed on 5 May 2006 is stalling, amid new insecurity across the western Sudanese region. In these circumstances, more calls are being made for armed intervention by Nato or other western forces. A quick examination of the record of military intervention and of the problems that would await an intervention force in Darfur, counsels caution and also suggests that the DPA's security-arrangements chapter can provide a blueprint for progress.

There are vigorous debates on the law and ethics of intervention that often serve to obscure the key criterion that justifies sending troops on a humanitarian mission: will they succeed? The limited patience of western publics for such missions especially when casualties are involved suggests that a variant on the criterion might be appropriate: will they succeed quickly?

()The real difficulties with the janjaweed disarmament plan are elsewhere. It is not at all clear that the Sudan government could actually disarm them. Although most were armed by Khartoum and have conducted joint operations with the army and air force, they have uncertain political loyalties. Most janjaweed leaders distrust Khartoum; many keep lines of communication open with the leaders of the Sudan Liberation Movement. Some could switch sides; all could resist an attempt at disarmament. Those absorbed into paramilitary forces might well mutiny. The army doesn't have much control outside its main garrisons and it certainly doesn't have the capacity to force the janjaweed to submit.

The trick is to break the problem down into manageable chunks and deal with them one by one. This is precisely what the DPA does. It specifies that the janjaweed should be confined to specific places, kept away from displacement camps and locations where people are returning home, and away from localities where the movements are withdrawing or encamping their forces. The first phase of disarmament focuses upon heavy weapons and vehicles. ()

A mission impossible

The African forces in Darfur have been given mission impossible. The world expects them to behave like a fully-armed protection force, but without the troops, the logistics or the mandate they need. A peace agreement has been signed but not by enough of the Darfur factions to make it politically workable, yet. The African Union's mandate has now been extended by three months to the end of 2006 after discussions at the AU summit in Banjul, Gambia; but the AU remains desperate to hand the mission over to the United Nations, and its aim is primarily to hold the fort and get out with as few mishaps as possible.*

() At the time of writing, it seems likely that a number of factors the failure of the Abdul Wahid Mohamed Nur faction of the SLM to sign the agreement, the weakness of the Minni Minawi faction (which has signed), widespread distrust of the Khartoum government, and the incapacity of the African Union will soon make the Darfur Peace Agreement a dead letter. An historic opportunity will have gone by. But the basic formula of a solution will remain unchanged.

*This article was published before the announcement that the AU mandate will in fact expire on September 30 and not at the end of the year.



Full text: http://www.opendemocracy.net/debates/article.jsp?id=3&debateId=130&articleId=3709



5. HIGHLIGHTS AND ANALYSIS FROM CITIZENS FOR GLOBAL SOLUTIONS: REPORT OF THE ICC PROSECUTOR ON DARFUR TO THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL



On Wednesday, June 14, 2006, the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Luis- Moreno Ocampo, presented his third six month report on the Darfur investigation to the United Nations (UN) Security Council as required by UN Security Council Resolution 1593 (2005). The report articulates the significant progress made by the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) and the challenges that lie ahead in the next phase of the investigation.



Full text: http://www.globalsolutions.org/programs/law_justice/darfur/OTP_Darfur_report_analysis.pdf







II. Updates from Around the World



1. THE SECRET GENOCIDE
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Otunnu, Olara A.

1 July 2006

()To the extent nearby Uganda receives any attention, it is generally in the context of the bizarre and brutal Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which has become notorious for abducting as many as 25,000 children during the conflict. Harrowing images of Ugandan children walking at night to avoid LRA raids have seeped into the public consciousness. That is where the awareness ends, however, and that's just how the Ugandan government wants it.

() The genocide in northern Uganda is a burning test for the United Nations' declaration on the "Responsibility to Protect," which was solemnly adopted by world leaders in their special summit last September. It was a commitment to act together to protect populations exposed to mass existential threats when their own government is unable to protect them or is itself the instrument of their suffering.

Even as world leaders inked that commitment, however, they were shirking their duty to the people of northern Uganda. Urgent action is essential to save them--and redeem the international community's promise. Independent international observers should be deployed immediately to report on atrocities and conditions in the camps. The international community must demand the dismantling of all the camps in the Acholi, Lango, and Teso regions and institute an organized program of resettlement.

Northern Uganda will test the maturity of the world's humanitarian instincts. Responsible humanitarianism must be comprehensive. The activism on Darfur's behalf is laudable, but international concern must extend beyond the crisis du jour. Above all, humanitarianism must be smart. The ERA is frightening, but northern Uganda's people have more to fear from their own government. It's time the world understood that.

Olara A. Otunnu, formerly the U.N. under secretary-general and special representative for children and armed conflict, is president of LBL Foundation for Children and a board member of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.



Full text: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/users/login.php?story_id=3492&URL=http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3492 (subscription required)





2. UGANDAN GOVT FINALIZES EMERGENCY PLAN FOR WAR-RAVAGED NORTH

Peoples Daily Online

8 July 2006



The Ugandan government has finalized an emergency humanitarian plan for resettling internally displaced persons in the northern part of the country affected by the rebel Lord's Resistance Army in their rebellion against the government.



The plan quoted by New Vision on Saturday contains emergency intervention strategies to ameliorate the suffering of the people.



Nsibambi said in addition to providing security, the government would focus on protecting human rights by deploying police in key areas, providing emergency food, water, shelter and health services in order to lower mortality rates and promote reconciliation in the communities.



Full text: http://english.people.com.cn/200607/08/eng20060708_281307.html

III. SMALL ARMS REVIEW CONFERENCE

1. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE AIMED AT STRENGTHENING GLOBAL EFFORT AGAINST ILLICIT SMALL ARMS TRADE ENDS WITHOUT AGREEMENT ON FINAL DOCUMENT

UN Department of Public Information

7 July 2006



The first Conference to review an ambitious 2001 Programme of Action to control the illicit trade in small arms ended this evening without agreement on a formal outcome document, thus failing to provide the General Assembly with either a mandate to conduct a further review in five years, or guidance on future implementation.

The Programme of Action, which had been endorsed by Member States in 2001, had provided for the convening of a Review Conference by the General Assembly no later than 2006, to assess progress in implementing the action plan

...Asserting that the real victims of the outcome tonight were the millions of people around the world dying daily from small arms violence, Finlands speaker, on behalf of the European Union, said he eplored the lack of progress on the priority areas, as well as on issues such as the role of civil society, civilian possession, gender issues, stockpiles management, man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS), and the human rights aspects of the illicit use of small arms. he said the Conference had missed an opportunity owing to the unwillingness of some delegations to make significant progress. He also regretted that civil societys momentum had not been matched by the will of States.

Canadas representative, confident that the General Assembly would see the merit of continuing with a formal follow-on to the Conference, said that Canada would seek to convene an informal intercessional meeting of States to discuss concrete measures to accelerate implementation. That meeting would be held in Geneva in the spring or autumn of 2007

Irans speaker said, however, that [failure to reach agreement] should not be seen as a failure of will to follow-up on the 2001 Plan. States could decide to hold biennial meetings and the General Assembly could decide to hold another five-year review, if it so wished. ee you in 2008, he added.

Kenyas representative said that his delegation had sincerely hoped for progress, particularly because his region continued to suffer the impact of the illegal small arms trade. But, the fact that delegations had refused to budge from their positions, had led to the Conferences failure. Kenya would continue to work on the issue -- within its region and beyond

If ush comes to shove, said Sierra Leones speaker, the issues debated here would be voted upon. e shall not depend on this concept of consensus, which, in my view, has been used as a weapon to destroy the work that we have done he said. He looked forward to the session of the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security), and, f we have to vote, we will vote, and make sure we save the people -- the children -- who are suffering from the use of these illicit weapons.r
Conference President, Prasad Kariyawasam ( Sri Lanka), said that an agreed final document had been ithin grasp, but, ultimately, it had been impossible to conclude it. In the final analysis, however, the Action Programme had remained an enabling framework that empowered States, global and regional organizations, and civil society to work for its full and effective implementation. Its validity and effectiveness remained undiminished; it was a living document

Full text: http://www.un.org//News/Press/docs/2006/dc3037.doc.htm


3. Secretary-General disappointed small arms conference ended without agreement, but says Global Community committed to action plan to curtail illicit trade

UN Department of Public Information

7 July 2006


The following statement was issued today by the Spokesman for UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan:



The Secretary-General is disappointed that the United Nations Conference to review the implementation of the Programme of Action on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons has ended without agreeing on an outcome document.



Delegates from all parts of the world reaffirmed that the most urgent task is to take firm steps to control illicit arms brokers. This issue will be studied in depth by a United Nations intergovernmental expert group, which will hold its first session in November.



Full text: http://www.un.org//News/Press/docs/2006/sgsm10558.doc.htm



For more information about the Small Arms Conference please see: http://www.un.org/events/smallarms2006/



All of the transcripts from the conference are available at:

http://www.un.org/events/smallarms2006/mem-states.html
 

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