Member Sign In
International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect
PDF Print E-mail
R2PCS Listserv
18 October 2006
Responsibility to Protect Engaging Civil Society

Email: This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it
In this Edition:
[Darfur: News and NGO statements]
I. News on Darfur; including references to R2P
II. NGO actions on Darfur: press releases, op-eds and reports
I. News on Darfur; including references to R2P
This Day
18 October 2006

(...)If the AMIS cannot fulfill its role of monitoring and protection in Darfur and the Government of Sudan is unwilling to allow deployment of a UN force, is there the possibility of invoking an emerging humanitarian value and norm known as the Responsibility to Protect? ()

The international community was confronted with similar, even though not identical situations, in Kosovo, Rwanda and Bosnia. In the West Africa sub region, we had bitter experiences of Liberia and Sierra Leone. We may face a similar situation in Cote d'Ivoire. ()

The report of the Commission which is widely cited as the 'Responsibility to Protect' was completed in 2001. () Although the ICCIC report did make only one reference to the experience in West Africa, those of us in this region can claim that we were the first to anticipate the development some of the elements of the responsibility to protect. Our process started with the bitter experience of the devastating conflict in Liberia which led to the development of the ECOWAS Protocol relating to the Mechanism on Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security 1999 and the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance of 20015. The next major endorsement was the AU Action Plan which mirrors some of ECOWAS concerns and that of the ideas of responsibility to protect. ()

If AMIS is incapable of protecting Darfurians and the Government of Sudan is vehemently against a UN peacekeeping force, can we invoke the Responsibility to Protect? Can we satisfy the five thresholds for military intervention? ()

If the criteria for international protection of Darfurians are not met, the AMIS is inadequate to protect them and the UN is prevented from deploying in Darfur, are there other options? () In the first place, it is important for the AU to go the extra mile to ensure that all the main warring factions sign the agreement. () The Government of Sudan must also realise that it cannot militarily win the war in Darfur. It must agree to enter to a further discussion with all the rebels.

In light of the fact that the UN cannot deploy without the consent of the Sudanese government; threat against the government is not likely to work; many countries will not participate in Darfur operation without the consent of the government; and even extending the UN force in the south to Darfur is not likely to be an option; the only option seem to be also to go back to the AMIS. AMIS is capable of doing the work if it is adequately funded, its number increased and it has the necessary operational logistics. The how is a matter of detail that the international community must workout.

Full Text: Unavailable
Genocide Intervention Network
17 October 2006
The Genocide Intervention Network commends President George W. Bush for signing the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act, which will impose economic and political pressure on the government of Sudan for its pursuit of genocide in Darfur. The signing of the DPAA follows recent appropriation by Congress of $20 million in support to the African Union peacekeeping mission already in Sudan. ()
It is troubling, however, that Congress chose to strip a vital section of the bill before passage, protecting individual states choosing to divest from Sudan," Hanis says. "The removal of this provision by Sen. Richard Lugar was especially disturbing given the wide, bipartisan support it enjoys in both houses of Congress."
In September, California Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger signed into law a bill divesting the state's largest public shareholders from companies funding genocide in Darfur. Similar legislation is pending in at least 15 other states.
()With the passage of the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act, newly-appointed Special Envoy Andrew Natsios can bring the full weight of the United States' diplomatic efforts to bear on Sudan, GI-Net argues. ()
Full Text:
3) Arab envoys say Sudan rejects new offer on peacekeepers
Associated Press
By Salah Nasrawi,
9 October 2006
Arab countries have launched a new effort to push Sudan toward a compromise over UN peacekeepers for Darfur, by offering to dispatch a force of Arab and Muslim troops, diplomats said yesterday.
The Arab League diplomats said Sudan's president, Omar al-Bashir, had rejected the proposal, as he has all suggestions of an UN-affiliated contingent.
But Bashir pledged to suggest an alternative, in a sign that the Arab effort might show more promise than Western attempts to stop the crisis. ()
The new push could be a significant step in the effort to reach a compromise over the Sudanese rejection of a Security Council resolution in August that would allow the United Nations to take control of and significantly expand a peacekeeping force in the western Darfur region, the African Union.
The two sides are still far apart, however. And it was unclear how much leverage, and determination, were in the hands of the Arab countries, neighbors, and supporters of Sudan's Arab-led regime. ()
Moussa carried the proposal for Arab forces to Bashir in Khartoum in recent days, said diplomats who accompanied the Arab League chief. The United States has asked moderate Arab allies, such as Egypt, to take a greater role on Darfur. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice made it a key mission of her Middle East trip last week.
Moussa proposed that Sudan accept thousands of troops from Arab and Muslim countries, who would go in a peacekeeping role. At first, the troops would join the African Union forces, with the possibility that they could later shift under a UN mandate, the diplomats said.
Some analysts have said they believe Arab countries will be loath to press too hard unless the United States makes progress on issues such as Israeli-Arab peace efforts.
Full Text: link
4) MEPs urge Sudanese to accept UN peacekeeping force
European Parliament
28 September 2006
In adopting a resolution on the situation in Darfur, the European Parliament urges the Government of Sudan to accept a United Nations peacekeeping force in Darfur, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. MEPs underlines that Sudan has failed in its 'responsibility to protect' its own people and is therefore obliged to accept a UN force in line with UNSC resolution 1706.
()MEPs stress that any failings by the Sudanese authorities in this regard will be sanctioned.
MEPs calls on China and Russia to play a positive role at the UN in efforts to ensure that a UN peacekeeping force can be deployed and to put to good use their role in the region to facilitate the deployment of that mission and prevent any bloodshed.

()MEPs urge the Chinese Government to act on this statement by using its influence with Sudan to persuade the Government of Sudan to accept a UN peacekeeping force. MEPs calls on the Arab League to cease its complicit approach to Sudan's continued intransigence over the need for a UN peacekeeping force.

Parliament calls on the EU to call for the urgent enforcement of the no-fly zone over Darfur established by UNSC Resolution 1591 and urges the international community to liaise with Chad to discuss enforcing the no fly-zone from eastern Chad. ()

()Parliament also calls on the EU, the US and other international actors to impose sanctions on any side, including the government, that violates the ceasefire or attacks civilians, peacekeepers or those involved in humanitarian operations and to take all necessary action to help end impunity by enforcing the Security Council sanctions regime.
Full text: link
II. NGO actions on Darfur: press releases, op-eds and reports
1) UN could have averted Darfur catastrophe
Minority Rights Group, Press Release
16 October 2006

() The report titled 'Minority Rights, Early warning and conflict prevention: lessons from Darfur' stresses the point that human rights violations of minority groups often lead to conflict. In Darfur in particular, the Sudanese government in collusion with the Arab militia, the Janjawid, have been actively fomenting division among ethnic communities over a long period of time. ()
The report states that apart from a few exceptions, alarms raised by the Sudanese minority groups and human rights activists were hardly picked up by international human rights bodies, the international media and conflict organizations until 2003. ()
According to the report as early as 2001, the UN Commission on Human Rights' Special Rapporteur for Sudan began paying particular attention to Darfur reporting his concerns on the deteriorating situation there. Despite this, in 2003, the UN's main human rights watchdog, the Commission on Human Rights, removed Sudan from its watch-list and ended the mandate of the Rapporteur. ()
'Calls for greater focus on Darfur were seen as a peace spoiler at the time and the Sudanese government and parties steering the peace process failed to realize the connection between the Darfur conflict and the wider Sudanese one," Gray says. ()
The report argues that despite the crisis in Darfur, and the earlier disaster of Rwanda, the UN still does not have a proper, co-ordinated early warning system. Amongst the key recommendations, is for the creation of a more integrated early warning system, which picks up on escalating human rights abuses. It suggests that UN member states develop rapid-response capability, so that teams with expertise on conflict resolution and on minority-rights issues, can be deployed at an early stage to attempt to head off catastrophes like Darfur.
Full Text and access to PDF report:
International Crisis Group
12 October 2006
etting the UN into Darfur is the latest policy briefing from the International Crisis Group. It examines ways out of the impasse over deploying a major UN peacekeeping force. Below are excerpts from the recommendations included in the report.
Africa Briefing N43, Overview:
() The international community has accepted the responsibility to protect civilians from atrocity crimes when their own government is unable or unwilling to do so. This now requires tough new measures to concentrate minds and change policies in Khartoum. ()
() Accordingly, the U.S., UN, African Union and European Union, acting together to the greatest extent possible but as necessary in smaller constellations and even unilaterally, should now:
apply targeted sanctions, such as asset freezes and travel bans, to key NCP leaders who have already been identified by UN-sponsored investigations as responsible for atrocities in Darfur and encourage divestment campaigns;
authorize through the Security Council a forensic accounting firm or a panel of experts to investigate the offshore accounts of the NCP and NCP-affiliated businesses so as to pave the way for economic sanctions against the regimes commercial entities, the main conduit for financing NCP-allied militias in Darfur;
explore sanctions on aspects of Sudans petroleum sector, the NCPs main source of revenue for waging war in Darfur, to include at least bars on investment and provision of technical equipment and expertise; and
begin immediate planning for enforcing a no-fly zone over Darfur by French and U.S. assets in the region, with additional NATO support; obtaining consent of the Chad government to deploy a rapid-reaction force to that countrys border with Sudan; and planning on a contingency basis for a non-consensual deployment to Darfur if political and diplomatic efforts fail to change government policies, and the situation on the ground worsens.
Full Text and access to PDF full document:

You may also find a previous report by the ICG on the Responsibility to Protect, its background, and failure with regards to Darfur by following the link below.

Darfur: The International Communitys Failure to Protect
Nick Grono
30 September 2006
African Affairs

3) How long must the people of Darfur wait for meaningful security?
Sudan Tribune
By Eric Reeves
16 October 2006
()This is a fair summary of the very significant challenges and risks of international non-consensual military deployment to Darfur. The critical shortcoming in the ICG analysis, and the report as a whole, is a failure to articulate with sufficient urgency, or acknowledgement of scale, the costs of not acting: specifically, the risks to a conflict-affected population of over 4 million civilians in Darfur and eastern Chad, and the number of deaths that are likely to follow upon continuing, indeed rapidly escalating human security.
Moreover, it is not enough to look at the current threat to human life and livelihoods: even if a political decision to deploy in Darfur non-consensually were made today (and such a decision is nowhere in evidence), the time to actual deployment of a force on the ground, in numbers that might reverse the current security crisis, is likely already measured in many tens of thousands of lives lost---very possibly hundreds of thousands of lives lost. In assessing the alance of consequences, we must not look simply at current conditions, but the massive mortality to date and what present evidence suggests will be the conditions obtaining several months from now, as well as the intervening, and accelerating, human destruction that has become inevitable.
The ICG report suggests that there is scope for additional diplomatic activity, that there are unused sources of economic and other pressures, and that these argue against non-consensual deployment. But as I argue above, ICG has failed to articulate persuasively the robust means necessary to move an increasingly defiant Khartoum regime. ICG certainly recognizes that he situation in Darfur demands the most effective response possible, that this an only come through full UN deployment, and that fforts need to be concentrated to bring about [UN deployment] as rapidly as possible. But none of the sanctions or punitive measures outlined offers realistic promise of significant near-term diplomatic re-calculation on the part of Khartoum, even as human destruction is rapidly accelerating. A calculus that fully assesses he balance of consequences does not permit the time-frame that ICG proposals imply for securing Khartoums consent. ()
The previous excerpts are part of a commentary piece by Eric Reeves, challenging the latest ICG report etting the UN into Darfur. Eric Reeves is a professor at Smith College in Northampton, Massachusetts, and has published extensively on Sudan. To find more of his commentaries:

To access the UN Panel of Experts report to which he refers extensively:

Full Text:

4) Darfur: No More 'Never Again'
Ann-Louise Colgan
October 11, 2006
Ann-Louise Colgan is the acting co-executive director of Africa Action, the oldest Africa advocacy organization in the United States.
The following article exposes the deterioration of the security situation on the ground and the realities of the role of the African Union in Sudan. After examining the timeline for action in the AU and the United Nations, Mrs. Colgan offers a thorough review of all individuals who have spoken for Darfur, advocating the responsibility to protect that the international community shares in this present crisis.
To view the article:
5) The AUs Responsibility to Protect
Council on Foreign Relations
Stephanie Hanson
October 6, 2006
() Peacekeeping experts note three requirements for a successful operation: a defined mandate and peace plan, stable funding and troops, and a commitment to fulfilling the operations mandate. The AU force in Darfur lacks all three, due to UN Security Council divisions. In a new Podcast, the Brooking Institutions Roberta Cohen says, he African Union is being used to create the impression that something is being done to help the people of Darfur. Meanwhile, the AU is considering another peacekeeping intervention: The Peace and Security Council has endorsed a plan to send 8,000 troops to Somalia, an operation with a projected cost of $931 million.
() It is the worlds only regional body that xplicitly recognizes the right to intervene in a member state on humanitarian and human rights grounds, write Cohen and lawyer William G. ONeill in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. But this ambitious mandate has its limitations, as shown in Darfur, where the country of intervention has effectively prohibited the peacekeeping force from fulfilling its mandate. Last year, the United Nations General Assembly endorsed the concept of the esponsibility to protect, but analysts, including CFR Senior Fellow Lee Feinstein, say the UNs response to Darfur has called into question its commitment to the principle.
Full Text:

6) Crying out for Safety
Amnesty International
5 October 2006
() The government of Sudan has recently launched a major military offensive, the scale of which Darfur has not witnessed for over a year. The Darfur Peace Agreement of May 2006 was supposed to herald a new era of peace. ()
Darfur stands at the brink of chaos. To avert disaster, the government of Sudan must allow UN peacekeepers into Darfur and the African Union peacekeeping force (African Union Mission in Sudan, AMIS) must be bolstered until a handover to the UN is possible. Regular and irregular forces under Sudanese government control must stop indiscriminate attacks, as well as deliberate attacks, on civilians both are crimes under international law.
Amnesty International is calling on members of the UN Security Council and the African Union to develop a common united position to secure the consent of Sudan to the deployment of UN peacekeepers, and to bolster AMIS in the interim.
What Darfuris want above all else is security: a halt to the fighting, the disarmament of the Janjawid, and, if these conditions are met, to return in safety to their homes. The international community has promised the people of Darfur much but now is the time for action. Effective peacekeeping must be brought to Darfur.
Full Text:
7) The 'Responsibility to Protect' Darfuris
International Herald Tribune
Lee Feinstein
21 September 2006
() No country can claim to have lived up to its responsibility in response to the slow-motion ethnic cleansing in Darfur. The Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Conferences have been silent or supportive of the Khartoum government in the face of Muslim on Muslim violence. China, Sudans largest importer of oil, has assumed the role of Khartoums guardian angel, blocking effective Security Council action.
() What is needed now is for the United States to lead a genuine campaign to get Sudan to accept the enlarged peacekeeping force the Security Council authorized earlier in the month. The African Union should now consider how to encourage and pressure Sudan to change course.
Washington should also lean on Beijing to use its clout with Khartoum. In the meantime, the U.S. European Command should dust off plans to provide material and logistical support to an augmented peacekeeping force. The United Nations, with the support of the Security Council, should line up capable reinforcements now, beginning with redeployment to Darfur of some of the 9,000 troops already in Sudan monitoring the Northouth agreement. ()
More broadly, the next UN secretary general should take the General Assemblys endorsement of the responsibility to protect as a mandate and mission statement for the institution. Universal adoption of the responsibility to protect has begun to remove the classic excuses for doing nothing in the face of mass atrocities. What is needed now is real capacity to back it up.
Lee Feinstein is Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy and International Law at the Council of Foreign Relations.
Full Text:
Many thanks to Marion Arnaud for compiling this listserv


Browse Documents by Region:

International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect
c/o World Federalist Movement - Institute for Global Policy
708 Third Avenue, Suite 1715, New York, NY 10017