

R2PCS Listserv

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Responsibility to Protect Engaging Civil Society

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I. UN-AU Summit

The following articles refer to the High-level talks initiated by Secretary General Kofi Annan in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia at AU head-quarters, with UN officials, Security Council representatives, AU, Arab League and African Officials. This meeting addressed the deteriorating regional situation, and proposals to bolster the AU mission in Darfur.

To view text and conclusions of the AU-UN summit:

<http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article18754>

1. ANNAN SAYS SUDAN SUPPORTS 'HYBRID' UN-AU DARFUR FORCE

Agence France Presse

17 November, 2006

UN chief Kofi Annan said late Thursday that Sudan has agreed "in principle" to the deployment a "hybrid" United Nations-African Union peacekeeping force in Sudan's troubled western Darfur region. ()

"A hybrid operation (phase three) is also agreed in principle, pending clarification of the size of the force," Annan said. "Appointment of senior officials in the hybrid operation will be discussed between stakeholders." Phase one and two refer to the build-up of the existing AU force and provision of major UN support to the African mission, which has been criticized for not having the means to stop the escalating violence in Darfur. Phase three is the merging of the AU force, known as AMIS, with a UN mission, although Annan said in his statement that the hybrid force would have to be "predominantly African."

He said the UN and AU would call a meeting of all parties that have not signed a May peace deal -- mainly two Darfur rebel groups -- within two weeks to discuss the matter. ()

Abdulmahmoud Abduhaleem, Sudan's UN envoy, said the proposal could be "largely accepted" by Khartoum, which has been vehemently opposed to any UN role in Darfur. ()

"This is a new plan that can be largely accepted by Sudan and takes 1706 to the graveyard," he said, referring to the number of Security Council resolution that authorized the UN force. "1706 is dead. This would be a "very special type of operation" with the UN "paying for the AU to do the job," Abduhaleem told reporters.

Earlier Thursday, Sudanese Foreign Minister Lam Akol said his government was willing to allow some international logistical support for the AU mission in Darfur but would never accept UN command of the force. And, asked by reporters about the possibility of blue-helmeted UN peacekeepers in Darfur, he replied simply "No.

"The UN chief, on his final tour of Africa as the world's top diplomat before stepping down at year's end, met with AU commission chief Alpha Oumar Konare and AU Peace and Security Council chief Said Djinnit.

In addition to Abduhaleem and Akol, representatives from Gabon and Congo, the current AU chair, and the Arab League, were also present. ()

But some diplomats had questioned the reasoning behind Thursday's meeting at AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, noting that Annan is a short-timer out and will be replaced in January by South Korean foreign minister Ban Ki-Moon. A UN official said Sudan has already made contact with Ban who will replace Annan as the head of the world body in January 1, 2007. ()

Full Text:

<http://uk.news.yahoo.com/17112006/323/annan-says-sudan-supports-hybrid-un-au-darfur-force.html>

2. UN-AU SUMMIT MUST STRENGTHEN INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN DARFUR AND CHAD

Human Rights Watch

15 November 2006

The African Union, United Nations and key governments must immediately bolster international forces in Darfur and increase pressure on Sudan to halt the spiral of militia attacks on civilians

in Darfur and Chad, Human Rights Watch said today. ()

Since late October, Human Rights Watch has documented several incidents of indiscriminate aerial bombing of civilians in northwestern Darfur and Chad by Sudanese government forces. () Political and military incursions from Darfur are inflaming underlying ethnic tensions in Chad, Takirambudde said. The widespread attacks in Chad suggest that these are not merely instances of localized, spontaneous conflict, but may be part of a coordinated campaign by Chadian militias to remove civilians from key areas. ()

Human Rights Watch called on the African Union, members of the UN Security Council and other key governments, including Egypt and Libya, to ensure that any international force deployed to Darfur and Chad has a robust mandate to protect civilians and sufficient capacity to deter further attacks. Human Rights Watch also called on the UN Human Rights Council to hold a special session or to devote a full day of its upcoming third session to address the worsening situation in Darfur and Chad. ()

Full Text: <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/11/15/darfur14609.htm>

II. Darfur

1. NEVER THOUGHT DARFURIANS FEAR REMAINS THE SAME AFTER 3 YEARS UN Sudan Tribune

19 November, 2006

U.N. Humanitarian Chief Jan Egeland on Saturday accused Sudan of continuing atrocities against civilians, following a visit to the region. () Below [are highlights of] the text of press conference with Jan Egeland, the Undersecretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator held on 18 November in Geneva.

() I returned yesterday from my fourth visit to Darfur. It is two and a half years since I was here. Never would I have thought that in my fourth and final visit the number of people in need of assistance would have gone from 1 to four million; and never would I have thought that the fear, the angst among the civilian population of Darfur would remain the same after 3 long years. Just imagine that this is now 1,000 days and 1,000 nights with defenseless civilians living in fear for their lives, for their future, for the life of their children, for the lives of their beloved.

In many ways, this is now, I think, a moment of truth here in Darfur, for our **responsibility to protect**

. In the United Nations, a lot of world leaders from all over the world from northern countries, western, eastern, southern countries, they all swore to protect civilian populations. We have a **responsibility to protect**

. We are not living up to that responsibility in Darfur today. ()

I say that this is, in many ways, a particular moment of truth. There have been several such forks in the road before. Now, too much is at stake. I mean a million lives were hanging in the balance in this operation in the spring of 2004. Now four million people need assistance. Never has more been at stake and never could we lose more if it goes wrong; never could we win more if it goes right. I am optimistic for the future in the sense that I now believe that we can now use the Addis Agreement to make progress. I am worried by what I have heard now that

one is starting to interpret words that could delay action.

Full Text: <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article18791>

2. DARFUR HUMANITARIAN AID HELD HOSTAGE

Sudan Tribune

By Fabrice Weissman

16 November 2006

Fabrice Weissman, research director at Mdecins Sans Frontiers (MSF), is the author of works on humanitarian aid and the political economy of conflict.

(Oct 2006) The intensification of fighting and the general increase in insecurity in Darfur have forced Mdecins Sans Frontiers (MSF) to drastically reduce its activities over the last three months.

() In the first place, such violent armed robberies could not possibly take place so regularly without the complicity if only passive of the regimes imposing security apparatus covering Darfur. Secondly, Khartoum has responded to United Nations threats of military intervention with xenophobic propaganda, likening all foreigners to "new crusaders" motivated by hatred of Arabs and Islam therefore, encouraging armed elements operating on the roads and generally drawn from nomadic clans to target relief workers. In all likelihood, the increased violence against humanitarian personnel results from a deliberate strategy by the government aimed at confining aid organizations to garrison towns (so that it can conduct its counter-insurgency campaign without hindrance or witnesses), but also at resisting the threat of international intervention by holding humanitarian workers hostage. If you insist on wanting to send in the blue berets, you should know that it will be at the cost of several deaths amongst relief workers. That is, in substance, the message being sent to the international community by the andits/militia operating with the consent of the regime. ()

()The splintering of the armed opposition into a dozen factions, frequently deprived of logistical networks and operational chains of command, requires aid organizations to negotiate with a growing number of armed groups whose territorial and military authority are uncertain and who are often more interested in looting aid resources than in the establishment of relief operations. [The] horrendous death toll appears directly linked to the brutality of Khartoums counterinsurgency campaign - not to the implementation of a secret program of systematic extermination of part of the Darfurian population. From a purely legal perspective, the atrocities committed in Darfur may fall under the 1948 Genocide Convention. However, historically speaking, they are more akin to acification campaigns carried out by European armies during periods of colonial conquests than to the methodical destruction of part of its citizens by the Rwandan state apparatus in 1994. ()

At this stage, implementing resolution 1706 requires declaring war on Sudan and invading its western province. Of course, no nation appears ready to take that on. () And, assuming that the Sudanese government ultimately agrees to accept U.N. troops, no country is currently willing, either, to provide the 20,000-person force that Resolution 1706 calls for. Nearly 80,000 blue helmets are already deployed around the world and the U.N. is struggling to find an additional 15,000 soldiers to strengthen UNIFIL contingents in southern Lebanon.

Furthermore, with the resumption of fighting and the opposition of many armed groups to the U.N.s deployment (or the DPA), it is difficult to imagine how the blue helmets would carry out their mission. As deputy U.N. secretary-general for peacekeeping Jean-Marie Guehenno emphasized on October 4, hen you try to apply peacekeeping to any kind of situation and confuse peace keeping with peace enforcement, you run very quickly into great difficulties ().

Who tells me that a half million square kilometres can be policed, that law and order can be imposed by an outside force is wrong. States are well aware of that and balk at providing troops to a U.N. mission they have mandated.

Despite its own doubts, the international community continues to promise the people of Darfur that their salvation will come from a U.N. military intervention, whose chances of deployment and success are currently slim. And yet, some humanitarian actors, like Jan Egeland, U.N. deputy secretary-general for humanitarian affairs, are participating in this interventionist campaign. Thus, they are also implicating aid organizations in the war camp and exposing them further to reprisals by Khartoum and its militias.

The neutrality required to intervene in a war zone prohibits aid workers from making judgments about the recourse to force or from speaking out on the international pressure that could prompt warring parties to respect the requirements of international humanitarian law. Yet, it remains that the international community's current strategy, while failing to stem the resumption of violence against civilians, is definitely contributing to the endangerment of the vital aid operations that more than one out of three Darfurians depend on. This observation is not, of course, intended to exonerate the warring parties from their primary responsibilities. They alone can ensure that the lives of non-combatants are respected and that humanitarian agencies can provide impartial assistance to the victims of the conflict.

Full Text: <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article18706>

To read more on MSFs stand on insecurity in Darfur:

http://www.msf.org/msfinternational/invoke.cfm?objectid=E52F0D97-5056-AA77-6C118F824221105A&component=toolkit.article&method=full_html

3. UNDERSTANDING AND MISUNDERSTANDING THE INTERNATIONAL REFUSAL TO PROTECT DARFUR: THE CASE OF MSF

Sudan Tribune

Eric Reeves

13 November 2006

() Doctors Without Borders/Mdecins Sans Frontires, whose operations on the ground are among the very finest in Darfur and eastern Chad, has---in the name of a specious eutrality---argued for precisely such acquiescence, vehemently chastising all who would argue for the urgent provision of civilian and humanitarian protection. Fabrice Weissman of the MSF Foundation has recently written two position papers---one public, one internal to MSF---that target all who would push for an international force to provide desperately needed security in Darfur. ()

Characteristically, MSFs Weissman neglects to note that many of the worlds most distinguished human rights organizations also strongly support UN Security Resolution 1706, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Physicians for Human Rights, Refugees International, as well as the distinguished International Crisis Group and many other policy organizations. Weissman would also be compelled by the logic of his argument to ignore the most recent statement by UN High Commission for Human Rights Louise Arbour, reporting on Janjaweed attacks on villages and a displaced persons camp in West Darfur. ()

MSFs current language of declaring war and invading [Sudans] western province is deliberately and irresponsibly inflammatory; this is not a neutral assessment but finally a crude and transparent political effort by the tendentious Weissman to bludgeon readers into seeing deployment to Darfur as nother Iraq. It is but another example of what Orbinski diagnosed as the denial of political responsibility to stop a crime that was ever again to go unchallenged. ()

() Weissman declares that he sees no evidence of a program of systematic extermination of part of the Darfurian population. But of course such evidence exists in abundance in the voluminous human rights reports Weissman has either not read or chosen not to credit (MSF for its part has in the past refused to make public its own very substantial evidence of the overwhelmingly non-Arab or African ethnicity of those it has treated in Darfur for almost three years). ()

Again, Weissman is surely correct in claiming that there is little evidence that the international community is prepared to undertake either consensual or non-consensual deployment to halt genocide in Darfur---to offer precisely the protection that MSF finds completely inadequate for its own staff. But this does nothing to change the moral and legal claims for such deployment. Weissmans tendentious neutrality and his glibly misleading account of genocidal destruction in Darfur are finally MSFs means of ignoring the explicitly articulated **international responsibility to protect** vulnerable civilian populations of precisely the sort we find in Darfur and eastern Chad (e.g., per the terms of the UN World Summit Outcome Document, Paragraph 139 [September 2005]; unanimously endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 1674, April 2006).

Weissmans argument reduces in the end to a crass expediency: it may be the moral and political obligation of the international community to intervene in Darfur, given explicit commitments made by all UN member nations; but such intervention doesnt seem likely, so its therefore irresponsible to speak about such obligations. Such expediency, and all that it represents, ensures more than anything else that there will be future arfurs. Weissmans conclusion is entirely in keeping with the disingenuous and expedient character of his argument: the longer international pressure for a UN intervention continues, the more humanitarian organizations will be in danger. But this is absurd in the extreme: humanitarian organizations are already terribly endangered, and only grow more so---not because of the threat of UN intervention, which Weissman insists is clearly not credible, but because Khartoum wishes to force humanitarian organizations to leave Darfur, along with journalists and other international observers. And it wishes to do so in order that it may achieve a final military solution without witnesses.

Indeed, security for humanitarian organizations has been deteriorating badly for well over a year, for reasons having nothing to do with the advocacy posture of international actors, almost none of whom called until recently for the force authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 1706. Jan Egeland is a heroic exception, having long and correctly argued that a force at least three times the present African Union deployment of 7,200 personnel was required for civilian and humanitarian protection. ()

But even so, given the excellence of MSFs field operations and its intelligence from the ground, we inevitably learn a great deal about the extent of Darfurs current insecurity, and in particular

its impact on humanitarian operations. Thus if we accept the bizarre disconnect between Weissmans preposterous pretense at eutrality on the one hand and the revealing detail of MSF accounts of security conditions in Darfur on the other, we encounter a highly revealing document, from one of the longest serving humanitarian organizations on the ground in Darfur.
()

()This is genocide. And given Khartoums transparent ambitions, it will continue until it is forcefully stopped. Doctors Without Borders/ Mdecins Sans Frontires may regard it as nflammatory to say as much. It is immoral not to say so.

Full Text: <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article18653>

To read more articles from Eric Reeves:

<http://www.sudanreeves.org/>

4. TO STOP DARFUR CONFLICT SPREADING, FOREIGN PRESENCE NEEDED ON BORDER WITH CHAD ANNAN

UN News

15 November 2006

Secretary-General Kofi Annan today called for an nternational presence on Sudans border with Chad to prevent the bloody Darfur conflict from increasingly spilling over to its neighbour, stressing that the United Nations has also not given up on its plan to send peacekeepers to Darfur itself.

ou have cross-border attacks and we are looking at the possibility of putting UN observers or some international presence on the border and working with the Government of Chad to ensure that the refugees who are in Chad are protected and to ensure that cross-border attacks would also be minimized, he told reporters in Nairobi.

ut we have not given up the idea of strengthening the force in Darfur because you need to do the two. If you abandon Darfur and try to strengthen the Chad side of the border, it is not going to work, Mr. Annan added, shortly before leaving for Ethiopia where tomorrow he will co-host a high-level meeting on Darfur arranged with the African Union (AU).()

Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guhenno, said yesterday that a UN fact-finding mission would visit Chad and the CAR next week. ()

Full text: <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=20617&Cr=sudan&Cr1=>

5. DARFUR: FOREIGN INTERVENTOIN A **RIGHT AND A DUTY** , ITALYS DALERMA SAYS

ADN Kronos International

14 November 2006

Italian Foreign Minister Massimo D'Alema referring to the ongoing carnage in Sudan's Darfur province said Tuesday that the international community has the **"right and the duty" to intervene.**

D'Alema made the remarks during a visit to China which, as one of the Sudan's main trade partners, has indicated it may block moves to impose sanctions against the Khartoum government.

"When a government violates the principle of responsibility, with regard to its internal affairs and

external relations, the international community has the right and the duty to intervene, naturally in accordance with the United Nations Millenium Goals," said D'Alema referring to the commitment by UN members to eradicate poverty and hunger and social injustice.

Full Text:

http://www.adnki.com/index_2Level_English.php?cat=Politics&loid=8.0.359584040&par=0

6. UN TO GIVE AFRICAN TROOPS IN SUDAN \$77 MLN

Reuters

13 November 2006

The United Nations will give \$77 million (40.4 million pounds) to an African Union (AU) peace mission in Sudans troubled region of Darfur, a top U.N. official said on Monday. ()

"We have agreed on two packages of support worth around \$77 million for the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS)," Hedi Annabi, a U.N. assistant secretary general for peace-keeping operations, told reporters after a meeting of UN, AU and Sudanese officials at AU headquarters in Addis Ababa.

Annabi said \$22 million would go towards funding military staff officers, police advisers and civilian personnel to strengthen the chain of command of AMIS.

A second tranche of \$55 million go towards equipment and personnel and a specialised support unit.

"The government of Sudan has agreed to the deployment of the two packages," he added.

A U.N. Security Council delegation had been scheduled to take part in Mondays meeting but disagreements over the composition of the delegation and whether the group had a mandate to engage in the discussion scuttled the plans.

Full Text: <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article18655>

To access the latest monthly report of the Secretary General on the situation in Darfur:

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/603/12/PDF/N0660312.pdf?OpenElement>

7. TIME TO FOCUS ON THE REAL CHOICES IN DARFUR

By J. Stephen Morrison and Chester A. Crocker

Washington Post

7 November 2006

J. Stephen Morrison, Director of the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS); and Chester A. Crocker, Professor of strategic studies, Georgetown University's Walsh School of Foreign Service, and former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.

()The Bush administration needs to concentrate on the real choices for exercising U.S. influence and make the achievement of a verifiable negotiated settlement to end Darfur's carnage its top priority. To get there, it will need sustained high-level U.S. engagement using the full weight of America's diplomatic resources, including a serious and creative test of Chinese intentions, during and after the November 3-5 China-Africa summit. ()

Resolution of the Darfur crisis can only be achieved if there is an intensified direct engagement with Khartoum and the Darfur insurgents, and mobilization of a concerted diplomatic effort to corral the Chinese, other UN Security Council members and neighboring African states. () The goal should be to obtain from Khartoum positive verifiable movement on the following series of incremental critical tests in Darfur:

1. To secure a ceasefire
2. Protect humanitarian relief channels
3. Establish a robust, hybrid African Union/UN peace operation
4. Begin to demilitarize armed groups
5. Advance a Darfur political dialogue. ()

First, there has been insufficient understanding in Washington of the confused and contradictory agenda we present to the Sudanese regime and its friends. ()

() Instead, The United States should lower its rhetoric and reaffirm that in time the International Criminal Court should handle allegations of genocide. The administration should also state publicly that it does not seek regime change and it should commit to multilateral reconstruction efforts once an enduring Darfur settlement is in place. ()

Second, the United States continues to be hobbled by uneven high-level engagement and inadequate institutional capacity. () Operationally, U.S. personnel remain under-sourced in Washington and Khartoum. Special Envoy Andrew Natsios should be empowered to bring about a cohesive interagency approach with a direct and regularly reinforced mandate from the Secretary of State and the President.

Third, Sudan must be placed higher on the U.S.-China agenda. () Part of legitimizing any long-term engagement in Africa will involve answering the many skeptics who rightfully argue that the Chinese have up to now callously disregarded humanitarian and human rights norms in its dealings with Sudan, along with Zimbabwe. ()

Full Text:

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/06/AR2006110600813.html>