Operationalizing the Responsibility to Protect: Building Trust and Capacities for the Third Pillar Approach

Policy Brief
February, 2012
Policy Recommendations

Frank and persistent dialogue is required through the United Nations with partners such as Brazil, China, Russia, South Africa, etc., and a host of regional organizations and Troop Contributing Countries on possible ways to fully operationalize the Responsibility to Protect.

Ensure that the third pillar toolbox is flexible, adaptable, complementary, effective and legitimate for timely and decisive action. The toolbox should reflect the operational diversity of RtoP crisis situations.

Link civilian and military action in a more coordinated manner with civilian protection, security sector reform, justice reform, development assistance, mediation and dialogue, humanitarian aid and other socio-economic development factors.

Drive efforts for more intense government-to-government and region-to-region negotiation and NGO and civil society input to address political constraints hindering early and comprehensive action.

Promote and actively encourage training among civilian and military personnel on RtoP. Training should also focus on human rights, international law and the role of women in crisis situations.

Prioritize consistency when operationalizing RtoP’s third pillar. UN Security Council Resolutions should be unambiguous in intent and language, as must operational guidance when –and if – civilian and/or military operations are launched.

Engage in more intense lessons-learned exercises and exchanges with operational bodies such as NATO. Promote official dialogue between the UN and regional security actors to uncover best practices.

Lower operational footprints by engaging with crisis-hit areas/countries in the aftermath of action to design and implement measures aimed at mitigating or alleviating the unintended costs of pillar three activities and at integrating strategies for re-building societies in the wake of crimes.

In a complementary fashion ensure that third pillar capabilities are linked with early-warning, preventive and capacity assistance mechanisms as well as with other UN offices and civil society organizations working on other issues - including gender-based violence and small arms policy - related to the prevention of atrocity crimes.
This policy brief is designed to inform a workshop being organized by the Madariaga - College of Europe Foundation, Global Action to Prevent War, the Global Governance Institute and the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect on 26 April 2012. The workshop will be an opportunity to bring together policy-makers from the United Nations (UN) and regional organizations and scholars to debate the challenges posed by pillar three of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) principle. The workshop will be accompanied with publications that will report on the proceedings, highlight recommendations for the UN General Assembly (UNGA) dialogue and beyond, and catalogue the paper contributions presented at the workshop.

As a basis for the workshop, the organizers launched a Call for Papers in January 2012 to invite scholars, policy-makers and civil society representatives at all levels to submit papers for consideration focused on two specific areas:

i) Enhancing the Legitimacy and Consistency of the Third Pillar Approach

Papers presented in this session will focus on methods and policy options of improving the legitimacy and consistency of the third pillar approach. Papers will seek to answer what more can be done by regional players such as the European Union (EU), if required and sanctioned by the UN Security Council, to boost the legitimacy of last-resort intervention when used to uphold RtoP. Papers will also address what more can be done by the UN Security Council (UNSC) to ensure greater trust in the RtoP principle through the consistency of its approach. Analysis will also cover how the Security Council can ensure that it has in place the correct capacities to act when faced with crises or, better still, is seized of potential crises when prevention is still a viable option.

ii) Improving the Effectiveness of RtoP’s Civilian and Military Tools

Papers in this session will analyse the political feasibility of conflict prevention and peacekeeping and peacemaking forces to stop mass atrocities at the earliest stages of violent conflict, and address methodologies and best practices to keep societies that have emerged from violence from falling back into cycles of violence. Papers may critically assess the relevance and effectiveness of current UN early-warning and conflict prevention capacities for RtoP. Furthermore, papers also critically appraise the military and civilian tools available for the UN and regional bodies such as the EU to react to atrocity crimes.

Papers in the sessions will include:

- Building Confidence and Trust in the UN Third Pillar Response Capacities
  Robert Zuber, Global Action to Prevent War

- Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: Pillar Three and the Prevention of Mass Atrocity Crimes
  Ruben Reike, University of Oxford & the Global Governance Institute

- A Reluctant Actor: China’s Dilemmas in the Responsibility to Protect
  Peiran Wang, Brussels Free University & PhD Candidate, East China Normal University

- The Business Society and the Responsibility to Protect
  Conor Seyle, Eamon Aloyo & Anna Bowden, One Earth Future Foundation

- The Regionalization of the Responsibility to Protect
  Kate Seaman, University of East Anglia

- Standards for the Implementation of the Responsibility to Protect
  Sheri P. Rosenberg, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law

- Operationalizing the Responsibility to React: Prospects and Challenges to a Robust Civilian Protection Doctrine
  Robert Schütte, Genocide Alert

- Gender Dimensions of Third Pillar Capacities: Women’s Contributions to Conflict Prevention, Early-Warning and Rapid Response
  Melina Lito, Global Action to Prevent War

- Sanctions, Trials and Peace: Promises and Pitfalls of RtoP’s Civilian Dimension
  Caroline Fehl, Goethe University Frankfurt

- An Examination of the Level of Standby Effectiveness in the EU for RtoP Style Deployments
  David Curran, University of Bradford
The selected papers will be presented at the workshop and will offer a comprehensive overview of the operationalization of RtoP. The papers will then be collated into a publication before the UNGA dialogue. For a full overview of the paper abstracts please go to abstract section on page 7.

The workshop is timely in that it aims to provide policy and scholarly input for the upcoming UNGA informal interactive dialogue on the third pillar of RtoP this summer, which is important because the dialogue will precisely and concretely discuss the third pillar implementation toolbox. The workshop is not concerned with the conceptual nature of the pillar itself, but rather on the range of peaceful and military measures and tools – such as economic sanctions, preventive diplomacy and mediation, fact-finding missions and, as a last resort, military interventions such as the implementation of no-fly zones and civilian missions - used for implementation. The workshop will also provide a good opportunity for civil society and policy-makers to discuss the issues raised by the papers and to look at country case studies in advance of the dialogue. The paper contributions will form part of a publication that will be widely circulated within the UN system and regional bodies as well as to academics and other policy-makers concerned about the norm and its implementation.

The workshop in Brussels on 26 April 2012 will highlight and assess a variety of recommendations for strengthening the authority, complementarity and robustness of various third pillar capacities. Those recommendations, addressed specifically to the UNGA and the UN Security Council, will be circulated along with the collection of papers prior to this summer’s UNGA dialogue. The organizers of this workshop are committed to long-term engagement with RtoP implementation tools and strategies long past the end of the UNGA dialogue and we welcome partners who share those commitments.

The planned workshop continues and builds on work already conducted on RtoP by the partners.

**Madariaga – College of Europe Foundation:** since 2008 the Madariaga – College of Europe Foundation and its various partners from the United Nations, the European Union, academic institutions and civil society groups have organized a number of events on RtoP. The events have aimed at fostering greater clarity of the norm, and to offer diverse actors the opportunity to engage constructively with RtoP’s ongoing development.

**Global Action to Prevent War:** has been engaged in collaborative, region-based processes to encourage discussion on the third pillar and to ensure that such discussion finds its way into discussions with diplomats and UN officials in New York. Working closely with a wide range of regional stakeholders, GAPW aims to ensure more transparency, accountability and robustness on RtoP implementation. GAPW’s programme stresses full participation by women in all responses to atrocity crimes as well as full involvement by diverse stakeholders worldwide and by complementary, security-related components of the UN system.

**Global Governance Institute:** has organized numerous briefings, high level workshops and several research and advice projects on RtoP. GGI places particular emphasis on the interaction between regional organizations and the UN system as well on integrated responses that draw on civilian, diplomatic and – as a last resort – coercive means. Current programmes build on GGI’s lessons learned projects on the Standby High Readiness Brigade for UN Operations (SHIRBRIG), and on the role the International Criminal Court and the UN Peacebuilding Commission can play in wider RtoP considerations.

**International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect:** since its founding in 2009, the ICRtoP has aimed to strengthen normative consensus on RtoP and further understanding of the norm through the publication of educational documents, development of toolkits, implementation of national and regional trainings, and mobilization of NGO Members and colleagues. ICRtoP also urges for civil society participation in and monitors UN and regional level discourse on RtoP and related themes, as well as conducts side events ahead of such meetings.
As the principle of Responsibility to Protect moves further away from discussions on norms towards operationalization, further thinking and clarity needs to be developed on the civilian and military capacities needed for a timely and decisive response under pillar three of the RtoP principle.

This is particularly important given the concerns raised by intervention in Libya, the recent United Nations report on “The Role of Regional and Sub-Regional Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect” (27 June 2011), and the upcoming 2012 UN interactive dialogue on the operationalization of RtoP. Pillar three of the principle focuses on the international community’s responsibility to take timely and decisive action to prevent and halt genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity in those instances where a State is unable or unwilling to protect its own populations. Action is not just about military intervention, but includes a broad range of political, economic and humanitarian measures.

Indeed, NATO’s activities over Libya in pursuit of UNSC Resolution 1973 have again raised questions over the timeliness, legitimacy, proportionality and effectiveness of military action. Such issues have now been made more acute given the emphasis on the operationalization of the RtoP principle, which has strong support from regional actors such as the EU. There is a need to analyse the consistency, legitimacy and effectiveness of civilian and military tools under RtoP, especially in terms of how they impact and complement both preventive and re-building strategies. Recalling that armed intervention is only a very small part of the broader RtoP process, boosting prevention and re-building efforts with expertise and financial resources is a key way to avoid intervention in the first place. Here, multidimensional regional organizations such as the EU and its newly created European External Action Service could play a decisive role in generating early-warnings and promoting long-term solutions to deep-seated structural problems in a variety of potential conflict zones.

There is a need to focus on methods and policy options for improving the legitimacy and consistency of the third pillar approach. It is necessary to understand what more can be done by regional players such as the EU, the African Union (AU), the League of Arab States or the Gulf Cooperation Council, if required and sanctioned by the UNSC, to boost the legitimacy of last-resort intervention when used to uphold RtoP. There is also a need to analyse what more can be done by the UNSC to ensure greater trust in the RtoP principle through the consistency of its approach. Analysis should also cover how the UNSC can ensure that it has in place the correct capacities to act when faced with crises or, better still, is seized of potential crises when prevention is still a viable option. Alternative suggestions, such as boosting the RtoP role of the UNGA through its ‘Uniting for Peace Resolution’, also require critical evaluation.

Another important element of the upcoming UNGA dialogue is the political feasibility of a range of tools, including conflict prevention and peacekeeping and peacemaking forces to stop mass atrocities at the earliest stages of violent conflict, or to keep societies that have emerged from violence from falling back into cycles of violence. Critical assessment of the relevance and effectiveness of current UN and regional early-warning and conflict prevention capacities for RtoP is also essential. Furthermore, there is scope to critically appraise the military and civilian tools available for the UN and regional bodies such as the EU to react to atrocity crimes. In this context, it is important to take into account the lessons identified from previous experiences with and of global and regional rapid reaction tools (such as the Standby High Readiness for UN Operations, the EU BattleGroups, the European Gendarmerie Forces, the NATO Response Force or the Qatari ‘HOPEFOR’ proposal) in order to advance a more sophisticated debate on what has worked and what has not worked in the field of rapid reaction tools for preventing mass atrocities.
Some important elements are key to operationalizing RtoP in a legitimate and effective manner.

Trust-building, Consensus-building, Collaboration and Transparency

Trust is paramount if RtoP is to be operationalized. On an international and regional basis more is needed in the way of dialogue between those governments who hold reservations about the principle. Indeed, when it comes to discussions about third pillar responses, long-standing divisions in the UNSC persist. As the recent experience of Libya and the ongoing crisis in Syria show, disagreements over the implementation of RtoP in the UNSC stymie efforts to bring greater clarity and consistency to the application of the norm.

No credible international consensus will emerge for operationalization without meaningful dialogue between actors such as the United States, the EU, the African Union, the Arab League, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), China, India, Brazil, Russia and others. We also urge more dialogue with both Troop Contributing Countries and with governments in regions that are experiencing early signs of violence against civilians. The natural platform for such dialogue is through the UNSC and UNGA.

Regional and local responses to crises are an effective way of boosting the legitimacy of RtoP’s implementation measures, and so the development of robust regional mechanisms would fit the idea that the principle should develop along regional contexts in partnership with UN preventive and response capacities. International coordination through regional bodies for military operations (e.g. no-fly zones) and civilian missions (e.g. monitoring missions) is a centrally important strategy for the legitimacy and effectiveness of RtoP.

Regional bodies such as the EU, AU, the League of Arab States and ASEAN should also seek to drive forward efforts through the UN by identifying, understanding and overcoming the institutional and political constraints hindering early and comprehensive action. Regional and government-to-government consultations are essential in this regard as is trust-building between policy-makers, RtoP advocates, academics and diplomats.

The media, non-governmental organizations and civil society groups working on related security issues also have a critical role to play in trust-building and communicating and overcoming the difficulties of RtoP implementation. All stakeholders must do their part to ensure that less violent means of response to the threat of mass atrocities have been considered before more aggressive measures are contemplated and implemented.

The implementation of Resolutions once action is authorized also causes problems. Ambiguous language can lead to ambiguous action which in turn breeds suspicion. Because a consistent approach to the implementation of RtoP can be difficult, joint efforts to define and prepare for all possible scenarios at both political and operational levels are crucial. In this regard, broader coalitions – rather than unilateral actors – are to be desired.

Operational objectives, should action become necessary, must be clear and give unambiguous guidance. Once a pillar three action has been completed there should be a comprehensive operational evaluation in order to encourage lesson-learning. This is particularly important given the diversity of operational scenarios that can emerge under an RtoP situation.

International actors have to be weary of the operational "footprint" which may result from operationalizing RtoP. Unintended human (civilian casualties, human rights abuses), political ("saviours turned enemies", "mission creep") and economic (environmental damage, capital flight, trade disruption) costs invariably follow operations. The task for international actors is to design methods of mitigating or alleviating such costs.
UN member states and regional organizations should share information on the structures they have in place for RtoP situations. Such a process would allow for a stock-taking of existing resources and the development of a roadmap for those resources needed in the future. The cross-pollination of best practices on early-warning and intelligence is an essential feature of capacity-building. The Joint Office of the Special Advisors on the RtoP and Genocide Prevention should be a key focal point in this process.

Civilian and military personnel should receive more expert training in human rights, international law and the role of women in crisis situations. In particular, special training should be given on the RtoP norm. Continued promotion and use of training programmes is required, but so is there space for greater scenario training to improve responsiveness to crisis situations.

One final important method of building trust and capacities for the operationalization of RtoP is by paying more serious attention to prevention and re-building in affected areas. There is a cyclical nature to conflict and mass atrocities. Armed intervention will never be enough to ensure civilian protection without a comprehensive strategy for human rights, development and legal and political reform over the longer-term.

Socio-economic development through justice, demobilization and demilitarization is essential; as are the linkages between civilan protection, security sector reform, justice reform, development assistance, mediation and dialogue, humanitarian aid and civil-military responses among other things. It is no secret that such an approach is financially costly and will require a commitment over the longer-term horizon, but it may be the only realistic way of ever having to avoid the use of force to end atrocities. It is also an approach that will save costs – both human and financial – over the long-term by avoiding conflict.

**Capacity-building, early-warning, training, holistic approach**

Having in place the right civilian and military capacities that can appropriately respond to a wide range of RtoP emergencies is of great importance. "Timely and decisive" action requires flexible, adaptable, complementary, effective and legitimate resources. Action also requires that the appropriate tools are financed. In this regard, there is a need to better define the relationship between civilian and military resources to enhance the long-term effectiveness of RtoP.

Capacity-building is particularly important at the UN level. Lacking in resources, personnel and access to rapid response forces, UN peacekeepers are hindered in fulfilling RtoP mandates. "Outsourced" capacities such as NATO will continually need to address critical matters of legitimacy and control. The task for both is how to become better at deployment, more effective when on the ground and better resourced by UN member states.

The idea of having a standing service that could respond to crisis situations would not only be a good vehicle for improving international effectiveness but also for focusing energies and building trust between UNSC members. Such a force – perhaps following the model of the decommissioned UN Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) – would necessarily have to work in cooperation with regional peacekeeping capacities such as the EU Battlegroups and the African Union Standby Force. Thus closer coordination and long-term cooperation between regional, sub-regional and global initiatives are of vital importance.

There is also a greater need to ensure complementarity between civilian and military responses and the wider set of pillar three tools which include diplomacy, economic sanctions and restrictive measures and fact-finding missions. Understanding the required mix of such tools for each given crisis situation is key to the longer-term legitimacy and effectiveness of RtoP.
Session 1: Enhancing the Legitimacy and Consistency of the Third Pillar Approach

Building Confidence and Trust in the UN Third Pillar Response Capacities

*Dr. Robert Zuber, Director, Global Action to Prevent War*

This paper looks at trust-building as one of the under-appreciated functions of developing a viable toolkit to enhance UN capacity to prevent mass atrocities. Zuber explains that anxiety around implementation of the RtoP norm is high within many UN delegations, especially post-Libya, and anxiety tends to bring suspicions to the surface, even among diplomats skilled at keeping such reactions in check. According to Zuber there are multiple dimensions to trust-building when it comes to developing tools and capacities for atrocity crime response, including trust in the reliability of the tools and capacities themselves; trust in the skills and motivations of the persons proposing such tools and capacities, and trust in the fairness, attentiveness and transparency of the institution (in this case the UN) trusted to house and implement the tools and capacities. This paper explores diverse options for trust-building to enhance the critical third pillar of RtoP so that the UN can become a more skillful, reliable, robust and responsible leader in atrocity crime prevention.

Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: Pillar Three and the Prevention of Mass Atrocity Crimes

*Ruben Reike, D.Phil. Candidate University of Oxford & Senior Analyst, Global Governance Institute*

This paper shows how since the Libya intervention, RtoP’s third pillar of timely and decisive response has gained renewed interest. Reike explains how while some are worried that this may trigger a wave of neomilitarism, the renewed focus on pillar three could also be seen as a welcome way of broadening the discussion on mass atrocity prevention to also include its coercive edge. From both conceptual and operational perspectives, Reike argues that the Libya crisis provides the opportunity to clarify the role of pillar three in RtoP’s under-developed preventive dimension, as the international community explicitly argued that its interventions in Libya aimed at preventively protecting civilians from mass atrocity crimes. The paper then argues that the Libya crisis suggests that the tools that are usually listed under pillar three might be of key importance for preventing mass atrocities in an immediate phase. Furthermore, the paper shows how “taking sides” and abandoning impartiality might become necessary elements of strategies that aim at the immediate prevention of mass atrocity crimes. Finally, Reike suggests that the Libya case can help to clarify how the prevention of mass atrocity crimes differs from conflict prevention by looking at what tools might form part of a mass atrocity prevention strategy; how these tools might be used; and what dilemmas and challenges might arise from their use.

A Reluctant Actor: China’s Dilemmas in the Responsibility to Protect

*Peiran Wang, Visiting Researcher, Brussels Free University & Ph.D. Candidate, East China Normal University*

Wang begins his paper by showing how China, as a rising power, has undertaken international responsibilities towards regional stability and peace in a step by step approach – i.e. dispatching blue helmets and sapper troops to assume mine-clearing and infrastructure construction in post-conflict regions under the UN framework. Wang also reiterates China’s acceptance of RtoP. However, Wang then argues that China remains persistently cautious to non-consensual force and is reticent about applying sanctions, particularly when these measures are not fully backed by relevant regional organizations. This ambivalent attitude and behaviour, states Wang, can be traced to China’s domestic realpolitik and strategic culture. In this paper Wang remarks how the lack of China’s strategic capabilities, the importance of the non-intervention principle in China’s diplomatic discourse, the concern with separatist movements inside China, the ambivalence of maintaining a balance between economic interests and normative values, and concerns about the use of force are important factors in China’s engagement with RtoP.
The Business Society and the Responsibility to Protect
Dr. Conor Seyle, Associate Director of Research, One Earth Future Foundation
Dr. Eamon Aloyo, Research Associate, One Earth Future Foundation & Senior Analyst, Global Governance Institute
Anna Bowden, Programme Manager & Research Associate, One Earth Future Foundation

In this paper the authors state that current formulations of RtoP focus on governmental and supragovernmental responsibilities, and the role of other societal sectors is not as well developed. This paper shows how business is particularly relevant to RtoP: historically, both national and multinational businesses have been implicated in RtoP violations both as participants in and resistors of genocide or human rights abuses. Drawing on historic cases as well as more recent business participation in democratic movements and the RtoP intervention in Libya, this paper argues that business has the capacity to bolster the effectiveness of third pillar interventions and moral, legal, and economic reasons to do so. Past research suggests that barriers to business participation may include perceptions that they do not have the capacity, responsibility, or legitimacy to affect violence. These barriers may be reinforced by the fact that formal engagement of international actors with business societies in RtoP interventions tends to take the form of economic sanctions rather than positive engagement. The authors argue that businesses have significant ability to contribute to the resolution of human rights abuses, that they have reasons to participate in RtoP third pillar interventions, and that policymakers considering interventions should work with businesses to improve the effectiveness of third pillar interventions.

The Regionalisation of the Responsibility to Protect
Dr. Kate Seaman, Post-Doctoral Fellow, University of East Anglia

This paper shows how over the past few years there has been continuous debate on the development of the RtoP, with the main focus of the debate dedicated to developing the norm in relation to practical applications and to ensure its success in governing international security. The implementation of the norm has however been restricted by the challenges organizations operating on a global level face in relation to both mandates and resources. Seaman argues that this has led to a shift in focus to regional organizations, and the potential these organizations have for filling the gap. This paper examines the increasing emphasis being placed on the ability of regional organizations to implement the realities of RtoP. It will explore the increased subcontracting of peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions from the UN to a variety of regional organizations including the EU, NATO and AU. Finally it examines the inherent dangers in removing control of these operations from a global to a regional level, including the challenges of legitimacy, accountability, resources, and capabilities.

Session II: Improving the Effectiveness of RtoP's Civilian and Military Tools

Standards for the Implementation of the Responsibility to Protect
Prof. Sheri P. Rosenberg, Director of the Human Rights and Genocide Clinic, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law

This paper identifies and articulates a standard for the implementation of the RtoP that strikes at the mid-term prevention level. Rosenberg shows how this point is one where risk factors can be assessed with sufficient certainty to predict future developments and prevention tools are known to us, but not so far down the road that extreme coercive measures - such as military intervention - appear to be the only ‘preventive’ options. This standard, the paper argues, will narrow the boundaries within which decisions over the appropriate practical policy responses can occur. The paper argues: first, that a unified, common standard will add a level of transparency and accountability to the deliberations over the application of the RtoP to a given situation; this will ultimately result in greater consistency in outcomes of state action and norm legitimacy. Second, the standard must be one that spans the full range of beneficial protection endeavours, including prevention. Third, that setting forward a reasonable standard, along with guiding principles, will increase the likelihood that all relevant stakeholders (including, states, regional organizations, NGOs, and International Organizations) focus on a discussion of appropriate action in any situation of stress, and reduces the depth and duration of debate that is centred on whether a situation falls or should fall within the RtoP framework.
Operationalizing the Responsibility to React: Prospects and Challenges to a Robust Civilian Protection Doctrine  
Robert Schütte, President, Genocide Alert

In this paper Schütte writes about how the third pillar is being hampered by an existing lack of understanding of how and by which means a threatened civilian population can be protected. Schütte argues that neither the UN nor NATO have a comprehensive civilian protection doctrine, which could guide future Mass Atrocity Reaction Operation (MARO). For Schütte there is thus an urgent need to discuss and develop a meaningful protection of civilians doctrine. The paper points out that given that those States capable of mounting MAROs are unwilling to contemplate massive ground invasions to halt mass atrocities, it is important to strike a balance between the political feasibility and operational effectiveness of such a civilian protection doctrine. In this regard, the paper explores the potential and problems associated with the use of airborne MAROs such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, airplanes and satellite imagery as opposed to ground invasions. Schütte also makes the case for better doctrinal guidance on protecting civilians, and states why it is important to strike a balance between the political feasibility and operational effectiveness of such doctrinal guidance.

Gender Dimensions of Third Pillar Capacities: Women’s Contributions to Conflict Prevention, Early-Warning and Rapid Response  
Melina Lito, Programme Director, Global Action to Prevent War

In this paper Lito states that the full integration of women’s skills, experiences and expectations in all aspects of atrocity crime prevention is an under-attended element of RtoP. Lito argues that while there has been some progress on establishing gender-based violence as a trigger for preventive response under the RtoP framework, little attention has been given to how women can become full partners in prevention and implementation. Given RtoP’s growing prominence as a key focus of the UN’s security responsibilities, Lito suggests that it is important to look at ways for women to become full participants in the formulation of RtoP policy and in the implementation of broad ranging RtoP mandates to halt mass atrocities and protect civilians. The paper will also draw on the core concerns and implications of a ‘Gender and RtoP’ working group brought together by GAPW and partners and involving key UN agencies and NGOs. The working group has produced a collaborative “Background Concept Note” outlining key RtoP needs, deficiencies and responsibilities in the gender area.

Sanctions, Trials and Peace: Promises and Pitfalls of RtoP’s Civilian Dimension  
Dr. Caroline Fehl, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow, Goethe University Frankfurt

Fehl analyses how the mounting international criticism of humanitarian interventions under the auspices of RtoP has led to an increasing interest in the civilian dimension of RtoP’s third pillar among both scholars and policy-makers. The paper discusses the theoretical rationale for using two non-military – sanctions and criminal prosecution - strategies under RtoP and highlights the potential pitfalls inherent in them. Fehl argues that where criminal prosecution is concerned there may be a risk of counterproductive and destabilizing effects on conflicts and peace processes and the danger that sanctions and trials are instrumentalized as symbolic responses to atrocities. This, Fehl argues, may help political actors to deflect domestic and international criticism and pressure for decisive action. Thus, the paper calls for a more careful consideration of the preconditions under which sanctions or trials may be effectively used to complement – rather than to replace – other military and non-military measures for protecting endangered civilians.

An Examination of the Level of Standby Effectiveness in the EU for RtoP Style Deployments  
Dr. David Curran, Lecturer, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford

This paper looks at the EU’s arrangements for rapid civilian and military deployment in peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations under the third pillar of RtoP. After giving an overview of how the EU has been envisaged as a vehicle for the spread of Human Security, Curran examines the EU’s standby military and civilian capabilities. Within each area, an analysis of existing arrangements, training structures and deployment experience is offered. By doing so, the paper examines how well prepared military and civilian peacekeepers are for intervention in RtoP-style operations based on mandates pertaining to the ‘protection of civilians’, and the lessons learned from deployments in the field. Curran then addresses whether there exists an ‘expectations/capacities gap’ between the values espoused by those who see the EU as a human security vehicle, and the capabilities that the organization is willing to use.
Resources

- High quality commentary and analysis is available through the Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. ([www.r2pasiapacific.org/news-and-events](http://www.r2pasiapacific.org/news-and-events)).

- For a collection of Spanish language RtoP documents, please visit Coordinadora Regional de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales' (CRIES) portal [http://www.cries.org/?page_id=60](http://www.cries.org/?page_id=60).

- To access the first, and presently only, German language portal on RtoP developed by Genocide Alert visit [http://www.schutzverantwortung.de/front_content.php](http://www.schutzverantwortung.de/front_content.php).


- The International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, bringing together NGOs from all regions of the world, seeks to mobilize global civil society in support of the RtoP norm. The Coalition has a complete resource centre on RtoP on their website, which can be accessed at [www.responsibilitytoprotect.org](http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org). Access to their Listserv and Blog is at: [www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/stay-informed-about-rtop](http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/stay-informed-about-rtop).

- The New York-based Global Center on the Responsibility to Protect has assembled abundant resources on many aspects of the RtoP debate, including efforts by governmental "Friends" of RtoP to promote the norm at UN headquarters. ([http://globalr2p.org/about/index.php](http://globalr2p.org/about/index.php)).

- The World Federation of UN Associations, through national chapters and with the partnership of Global Action to Prevent War and other groups, is promoting RtoP in national capitals worldwide. ([www.wfuna.org/r2p-activities](http://www.wfuna.org/r2p-activities)). Recent events by the Federation have initiated constructive dialogue in detractor states including China and Venezuela.

- The journal, Global Responsibility to Protect edited by Alex Bellamy and other affiliates of the Brisbane Centre, is a clearinghouse for some of the best thinking about the norm and its implementation. ([www.brill.nl/global-responsibility-protect](http://www.brill.nl/global-responsibility-protect)).

- The International Crisis Group has been providing leadership on various efforts to assess, promote and implement the RtoP norm. ([www.crisisgroup.org/en/key-issues/responsibility-to-protect.aspx](http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/key-issues/responsibility-to-protect.aspx)).
Further Reading


This Policy Brief was produced by the Madariaga – College of Europe Foundation, Global Action to Prevent War, the Global Governance Institute and the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect in February 2012.

For more information on this initiative please contact Daniel Fiott at dfiott@madariaga.org.

Contact
Madariaga – College of Europe Foundation
14, Avenue de la Joyeuse Entrée
B-1040, Brussels
Belgium